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Abstract
This thesis examines how differently various monetary policy strategies affect macroeconomic condi-
tions in the presence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (ZLB) when monetary policy
has supply-side effects. The supply-side effect of monetary policy is generally considered as transmit-
ted through the cost channel of monetary policy. This thesis consists of three independent but related
studies.
In the first study, I examine the robustness of an unconventional monetary policy in a cost chan-
nel economy. This unconventional policy, proposed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017, American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, SGU henceforth), recommends a tight monetary policy during
a liquidity-trapped recession to stimulate the economy and to avoid jobless recovery. The results of
my study show that the existence of the cost channel implies that the SGU policy induces sharp initial
contractions in the employment rate and the growth rate, and a sharp increase in inflation following a
negative confidence shock. Welfare is lower in cost channel economies compared to no-cost channel
economies due to the SGU policy recommendation. Two alternative interest rate-based exit policies
are also examined. The Overshoot interest rate policy, irrespective of the presence of the cost chan-
nel, is superior to the SGU policy with regard to welfare. The Staggered policy has lower immediate
pain in the cost channel economy compared to the SGU policy or the Overshoot policy. However,
welfare-wise, the Staggered policy is inferior to the other two policies examined in both economies
considered.
In the second study, I analyse optimal monetary policy, both under discretion and under commit-
ment, in a cost channel economy in the presence of the ZLB. I use a variation of the standard New
Keynesian model. Under discretionary policy, it was found that central banks needed to keep interest
rates at the zero lower bound for longer in a cost channel economy compared to a no-cost channel
economy. Under commitment policy, the simulation exercise shows that the central bank is able to
terminate the zero interest rate regime earlier in a cost channel economy than in a no-cost channel
economy. It was also revealed that the cost channel generates significantly higher welfare losses es-
pecially under discretionary policy. Accordingly, abstracting the cost channel in these type of models
can lead to under estimation of welfare losses.
In the third study, I evaluate interest rate rules at the ZLB in a cost channel economy. In addition,
an endogenous threshold-based forward guidance (FG) policy rule is examined. Under Taylor-type
ii
truncated rules (TTR), first, the cost channel economy is more likely to fall into a liquidity trap and
remain longer compared to the no-cost channel economy. Second, the risky steady state of a cost
channel economy has more deflation bias than a no-cost channel economy. Third, the welfare loss is
higher when uncertainty is high and it is appreciably higher in cost channel economies. Under the
FG rule, compared to the TTR, the following results hold, irrespective of the cost channel: First, an
appropriate FG rule can avoid deflation bias while strict FG leads to an inflation bias. Second, the FG
rule reduces the frequency of liquidity-trapped recessions. Third, the depth of the recession under the
FG rule is lower. The existence of the cost channel amplifies the inflation bias under the FG rule.
Accordingly, all five monetary policy strategies considered in the three studies in this thesis af-
fect the economy differently when the cost channel of monetary policy exists in the presence of the
ZLB. Importantly, a liquidity-trapped recession is deeper in cost channel economies. These findings
suggest that if a cost channel is present in an economy, the transmission of monetary policy may be
different from that in a no-cost channel economy in the presence of the ZLB. Therefore, central banks
should pay careful attention to the cost channel of monetary policy when they set policies under such
economic conditions.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
This thesis examines how differently various monetary policy strategies affect macroeconomic condi-
tions in the presence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (ZLB) when monetary policy
has supply-side effects. The supply-side effect is generally considered as transmitted through the cost
channel of monetary policy. A cost channel exists in an economy if changes in nominal interest rates
affect the cost of production directly. The existing literature has studied the supply-side effects of
monetary policy, although the amount of work on supply-side effects is far less than on the well-
established demand-side effects. Yet, there is a void in the literature when it comes to the interaction
between the supply-side effects of monetary policy and the presence of the ZLB. This study attempts
to fill part of this void by considering the transmission of several monetary policy strategies in the
presence of the ZLB in a cost channel economy.
The thesis consists of three independent but related studies. The three studies analyse the impact
of five different monetary policy strategies in a cost channel economy in the presence of the ZLB. All
the monetary policy strategies considered in this thesis are interest rate-based. The studies included in
the thesis compare and contrast the impact of monetary policy strategies in cost channel and no-cost
channel economies.
The first study, presented in Chapter 3, considers an unconventional monetary policy. This uncon-
ventional policy, proposed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017), suggests increasing nominal interest
rates during a recession. They show this policy is able to stimulate economic activities during a re-
cession and to avoid jobless recoveries in the aftermath of the recession. The recession is caused by a
confidence shock. In this study, I consider the robustness of those results in a cost channel economy.
The second and third studies analyse more conventional monetary policies which are presented in
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respectively. The second study considers optimal monetary policy, both
under commitment and discretion, in a ZLB environment within a cost channel economy. The third
study considers interest rate-based monetary policy rules in the presence of the ZLB. The first section
of the third study analyses Taylor-type interest rate rules in a cost channel economy. The second
section of the third study analyses a novel interest rate-based forward guidance rule.
The next section provides the background and motivation to the overall study. Then, the broad
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research question, the objective of the study, the methodology and major assumptions made within
the study are stated. Finally, the structure of the rest of the thesis is provided at the end of the chapter.
1.2 Background and Motivation
Understanding the monetary policy transmission mechanism is of paramount importance to the suc-
cessful conduct of monetary policy. The monetary policy transmission mechanism comprises the
channels through which monetary policy innovations impact on the real economy. Most economists
agree that there can be important effects on real economic variables due to monetary disturbances, at
least in the short-run.1 Traditional text book explanations state that the monetary authority uses the
short-term policy interest rate to control inflation or output in at least three important ways, namely,
the traditional interest rate channel, the credit channel and the other asset price channels by influ-
encing the aggregate demand.2 The most conventional of these channels is the traditional interest
rate channel. According to this channel, an increase of the policy rate increases the cost of capital,
reducing investments and household spending on durable goods. Consequently, the reduction in ag-
gregate demand causes a decrease in output. Second, the credit channel is based on the problem of
asymmetric information in financial markets. Third, the other asset price channels affect the prices of
assets other than interest rates such as foreign exchange rates and prices of equities. Considering these
channels, economists widely agree that monetary policy transmission to the real economy is affected
by demand-side channels (see Mishkin, 2013). There is, however, far less agreement regarding the
supply-side effects of monetary policy disturbances on the real economy.
The notion of the supply-side effects of monetary policy, which is also known as the Wright
Patman effect or Cavallo effect, goes back to at least John Kenneth Galbraith (1957). Galbraith
mentioned that monetary policy has two types of effects on individual firms: the well-known demand
effect and the impact effect. The impact effect is the direct influence on the operations of firms due to
changes in money supply or nominal interest rates. This impact of monetary policy on the supply-side
of the economy is now popularly known as the cost channel of monetary policy.
Although scholars had mooted the idea of the effect of monetary policy on the supply-side of the
economy earlier, the scholars renewed their interest when the price puzzle was found in vector autore-
1See Walsh (2010, p.9).
2See Mishkin, 2013, pp.662-70.
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gression (VAR) studies.3 The price puzzle relates to the rise in the price level due to a contractionary
monetary policy shock (Walsh, 2010, p.22). In a seminal paper, Barth and Ramey (2001) argued that
the price puzzle is a result of the cost channel of monetary policy. Subsequent to the work of Barth
and Ramey (2001), many scholars have evaluated the importance of the cost channel of monetary
policy. Most studies evaluating the cost channel, both theoretically and empirically, have concluded
that it is an important channel to consider.
On the theoretical front, using a New Keynesian model, Ravenna and Walsh (2006) showed that
the cost channel introduces a trade-off between stabilising inflation and the output gap. In contrast,
in the standard New Keynesian model, typically, an exogenous cost push shock is added to generate
such trade-off.4
On the empirical front, using VAR studies, Barth and Ramey (2001), Dedola and Lippi (2005)
and Kim and Lastrapes (2007) have emphasised the importance of the cost channel. Studies such as
those of Christiano et al. (2005) and Christiano et al. (2015) have established the importance of the
cost channel by conducting New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) studies.
Ravenna and Walsh (2006), Chowdhury et al. (2006) and Tillmann (2009b) have empirically valid-
ated the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) augmented by the cost channel. Gaiotti and Secchi
(2006) carried out a study with firm-level data from Italian manufacturing firms to confirm the import-
ance of the cost channel. In contrast to above findings, Rabanal (2007) and Kaufmann and Scharler
(2009) have showed in their studies that the impact of the cost channel is minimal on dynamics of
macroeconomic variables, as demand-side channels are dominant.
Both in theoretical and in empirical studies scholars generally incorporate the cost channel by
assuming firms have to borrow working capital externally.5 It is considered that changes in short-
term interest rates in cost channel economies affect the marginal cost of production; in turn affecting
product prices and output (see Barth and Ramey, 2001). Accordingly, the dynamics of the inflation
rate and the dynamics of the output gap behave differently following a monetary policy shock in a cost
3For example, see Sims (1992) for a VAR study with the price puzzle.
4The phenomenon that standard New Keynesian models does not introduce a trade-off between stabilising the output
gap and stabilising the inflation gap in the face of an external demand shock has been named as divine coincidence by
Blanchard and Gali (2007).
5Note that money-in-the-production function could also generate the supply-side effects of monetary policy (for
example, see Benhabib et al., 2001a). There is a line of research that spans decades which considers money-in-the-
production function (for example, see Fischer, 1974). In this literature, scholars generally assume firms demand money to
economise the use of other inputs. However, beginning with Sinai and Stokes (1972), the empirical debate has been ongo-
ing as to whether money is an omitted variable of the production function. The introduction of money-in-the-production
function is not popular in contemporary macroeconomic models. In this thesis, I do not consider the money-in-the-
production function as a way of introducing the supply-side effects of monetary policy.
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channel economy. When the established demand-side channels suggest monetary tightening dampens
inflation, the cost channel suggests complete opposite; monetary tightening raises inflation. With
regard to the output gap, both demand-side and supply-side channels suggest monetary tightening
dampens the output gap. Yet, the cost channel amplifies the drop in the output gap.
The cost channel has become a common building block in contemporary optimising agent models.
Beginning with Fuerst (1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992, 1995), who assumed that firms
must borrow to fund their wage bill in a basic cash-in-advance (CIA) model,6 many scholars have
incorporated the cost channel in optimising agent models. For example, Hülsewig et al. (2009),
Christiano et al. (2010) and Christiano et al. (2013, 2015) introduced this channel in New Keynesian
models.
Although the cost channel has become a common building block in contemporary monetary mod-
els, the impact of the existence of the cost channel on economic conditions in the presence of the
ZLB7 has not been exclusively explored.8 The ZLB is no longer just of theoretical interest. Short-
term nominal interest rates were at the zero lower bound in the recent past in many countries around
the world. Figure 1.1 presents the movements of annualised monthly short-term nominal interest rates
in G7 countries9 during 1990 - 2016. The figure shows that in the Great Recession,10 all G7 countries
have approached the ZLB. This phenomenon has been unprecedented for many countries, although
Japan experienced zero policy rates in the 1990s. Eight years on, following the Great Recession,
short-term interest rates are still at very low levels in many countries. By the end of 2016, the US
target federal funds rate was 0.5 − 0.75%. During the period 2008Q3 - 2015Q4, the target federal
funds rate was at its effective lower bound of 0− 0.25%.
6CIA models are built as a direct approach to generating a role for money. These models capture the role of money as
a medium of exchange by requiring explicitly that money must be used to purchase goods (Walsh, 2011, p.98).
7Recently, four central banks in Europe, including the European Central Bank, Swedish Riksbank and the central bank
of Japan have pushed short-term nominal interest rates below the zero lower bound. This phenomenon is unprecedented
and is confined to those central banks only. In this thesis, unless otherwise specified, I consider the short-term nominal
interest rate is constrained by the ZLB.
8Note that Chattopadhyay and Ghosh (2016) very recently discussed optimal monetary policy at the ZLB in a cost
channel model. They studied a similar question and reported similar results to those in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Both
studies were conducted during the same time period but independently. More details about Chattopadhyay and Ghosh
(2016) are given in Chapter 4.
9G7 is a group of countries with advanced economies. The group consists of: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the United Kingdom and the United States.
10The Great Recession prevailed during December 2008 - June 2009 (Source: NBER - US Business Cycle Expansions
and Contractions, Available at http://www.nber.org/cycles.html, Accessed on 11-12-2016).
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Figure 1.1: Short-term Nominal Interest Rates in G7 Countries During 1990-2016
The cost channel may introduce an economic impact in the presence of the ZLB in two broad
ways. The first is through the direct cost channel. This is the most common channel. According to
the direct cost channel, changes in nominal interest rates affect production costs and thereby affect
inflation and output. The second is through the expectation cost channel. According to the expectation
cost channel, expectations of possible future changes in nominal interest rates affect today’s economic
conditions through the cost channel. This is because of the rational expectations of economic agents.
For example, if agents expect future ZLB occurrences in a cost channel economy, they make their
decisions today by incorporating both the impact of the cost channel and the possibility of ZLB
occurrences into their decision making process.
In this study, as mentioned before, I consider the analysis in the presence of the ZLB. Broadly, it is
possible to categorise the policy regimes which I work with into three. The first is the steady state with
positive nominal interest rates. The second category is that of transition regimes. These are transition
periods from steady states with positive interest rates to zero interest rate regimes and vice versa.
In these two regimes, since the net nominal interest rate is strictly positive, both channels discussed
above, i.e. the direct cost channel and the expectation cost channel are active. The third is the zero
interest rate regime. In this regime, since the nominal interest rate is zero, the direct cost channel is
not active. Therefore, only the expectation cost channel is active in zero interest rate regimes.
As discussed above, monetary policy transmission to the real economy can be different in the
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presence of the ZLB in a cost channel economy than in a no-cost channel economy. This fact mo-
tivates the present study. The understanding of such monetary policy transmission mechanism at the
ZLB in a cost channel economy would be useful to both monetary policymakers in their conduct of
policy and the general public to inform their decision making processes. Further, this understanding
would be useful to academics to enhance their knowledge about monetary transmission mechanism
and shape their future research work.
The above discussion provides the background and motivation to the study. Next, I briefly state
the research question, the objective, the methodology and assumptions. I conclude by presenting the
organisation of the rest of the thesis at the end of the chapter.
1.3 Research Question
The main research question that I shall investigate in this thesis is the following: How differently
do various monetary policy strategies affect macroeconomic conditions in the presence of the ZLB
when the economy experiences the supply-side effects of monetary policy, in addition to demand-side
effects?.
1.4 Objective
The main objective of this thesis is to shed light on the monetary policy transmission mechanism in
the presence of the ZLB when a cost channel of monetary policy is present. For this purpose, I con-
sider three different but related studies to explore five monetary policy strategies. First, I incorporate
the cost channel in an existing model to analyse the jobless recovery process and an unconventional
interest rate-based exit policy during a liquidity-trapped recession. Second, I evaluate optimal mon-
etary policy, under both discretion and commitment, in a cost channel economy in the presence of the
ZLB. Third, I study interest rate rules and forward guidance rules in a cost channel economy in the
presence of the ZLB and under uncertainty. In each of these studies, I compare and contrast effects
of monetary policy actions in cost channel and no-cost channel economies.
It is not an objective of this study to evaluate the strength of the cost channel in an economy.
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1.5 Methodology and Major Assumptions
In the three studies in this thesis, I deploy rational expectations models with optimising agents. In the
first study, I consider a model with nominal wage rigidities and with fully flexible prices. In contrast,
in the second and third studies, I accommodate a variation of the standard New Keynesian model, in
which prices are rigid but wages are flexible.
Following are the major assumptions that I have made throughout the study. First, I assume
monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB. However, in some sections, as specified under those
sections, I relax that assumption for comparison purposes. Second, I assume a cost channel exists in
the economy. Third, monetary policy has only one instrument, i.e. the short-term nominal interest
rate. In the third study, the central bank may carry out forward guidance based on the interest rate.
Fourth, I assume that there is no risk premium for corporate borrowings. Further, I consider
that transmissions of changes in policy interest rates to retail rates are complete and immediate. In
addition, I assume financial intermediaries operate in a competitive market and there are no financial
frictions to create a spread between corporate borrowing rates and corporate lending rates. These
assumptions make short-term policy rates equal to corporate borrowing and corporate lending rates.
Fifth, I ignore capital in these studies. Sixth, in the first and second studies, I assume perfect
foresight, in which the monetary authority has perfect information about the evolution of the economy
and the public is fully aware of the future policy path. In these economies, there is no uncertainty.
However, in the third study, I relax this assumption and introduce uncertainty. Seventh, all the three
studies are conducted in the context of a closed economy.
A discussion of these major assumptions is provided at the end of the thesis in Section 6.2, in
addition to discussions provided under each study.
1.6 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides the historical background and
empirical evidence for the cost channel of monetary policy. Chapter 3 is devoted to the study of
Jobless Recovery, Liquidity Trap, Tight Monetary Policy and the Cost Channel, while Chapter 4 is on
the study of Optimal Monetary Policy at the ZLB in a Cost Channel Economy. Chapter 5 examines
Interest Rate Rules, Forward Guidance Rules and the ZLB in a Cost Channel Economy. Finally,
Chapter 6 provides conclusions and a discussion of the overall study.
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". . . the senselessness of trying to fight inflation by raising interest rates. Throwing gasoline on fire
to put out the flames would be as logical."
Wright Patman in 197011
2.1 Introduction
With regard to the cost channel of monetary policy, there are two main questions raised by monetary
economists, policy makers and practitioners alike. The first question is: Does a cost channel of
monetary policy exist? and the second question is: If so, does the existence of the cost channel have
important implications for monetary policy?. Finding answers to the first question is not a direct
objective of this thesis. This thesis assumes that a cost channel exists in the economy. However, in
this chapter, among other things, I attempt to collect evidence from the empirical literature to answer
Question 1. I shall show that, in general, a cost channel exists in an economy.
Finding answers to the second question is an objective of this study; specifically, in this thesis, I
attempt to find answers to Question 2 within the context of the ZLB constraint. Given a cost channel
does exist, this thesis studies broadly, its implications for monetary policy in the presence of the ZLB.
Here, in preparation for the rest of the study, I shall show that the cost channel introduces important
implications for the conduct of monetary policy under normal economic circumstances.12
Based on the empirical literature review in this chapter, my answers to the two questions raised
above are ‘yes’. Answering these questions under normal economic conditions is important for the
present study for two reasons. First, this thesis assumes a cost channel exists in an economy. There-
fore, the validity of this assumption has to be justified. This is important as the cost channel is assumed
to work in the opposite direction to the conventional wisdom with regard to inflation dynamics. Ac-
cordingly, strong evidence is required to ensure that a cost channel does exist. Second, this thesis
considers a special economic environment – the zero interest rate regime –. Therefore, implications
for monetary policy under normal economic conditions has to be identified, at least for comparison
purposes.
11Cited by Seelig (1974).
12By stating ‘normal economic conditions’ what I mean is follows: Under normal economic conditions, economy may
not move to the zero interest rate regime or agents do not expect zero interest rate occurrences in the foreseeable future.
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The focus of this chapter is to review empirical literature on the cost channel, concentrating on
the two questions raised at the beginning of this section. In doing so, I first discuss the historical
background of the cost channel in Section 2.2. Then, in Section 2.3, I address the two questions
raised above using empirical literature. Finally, a brief discussion of key applications of the cost
channel in contemporary economic models is given in Section 2.4.
2.2 Historical Background
Although discussions of the supply-side effects of monetary policy goes back at least to Galbraith
(1957), Steven A. Seelig was the first to test these effects in an economic model.13 Seelig was motiv-
ated to study supply-side effects due to the high inflation that prevailed in the USA during the period
mid 1950s and late 1960s. The comments of Congressman Wright Patman, cited at the beginning of
this chapter, also influenced Seelig to explore the supply-side effects of monetary policy.
Seelig (1974) formulated a model with product markup pricing,14 directly affected by the nominal
interest rate. The impact of the cost channel was empirically estimated for the period 1955-1969 for
the USA using time series data from 41 industries. However, the results found by Seelig did not
support the hypothesis that increases in interest rates lead to higher prices via markup pricing.
In 1981, Mathew Shapiro carried out a study titled “Identification and Estimation of the Wright
Patman Effect” as cited by Barth and Ramey (2001). According to Barth and Ramey, Shapiro has
estimated a Cobb-Douglas markup equation to confirm significant interest rate effects on the price
level. Van Wijnbergen (1982, 1985) are the last two studies, according to my reading, which directly
assessed the impact of nominal interest rates on prices in the 20th century. He studied the effect of
changes in nominal interest rates in the real cost of working capital in a structural macroeconomic
model for the Korean economy. He found econometric evidence to show that this effect is significant
and it has implications on inflation. Van Wijnbergen refers to this effect as the Cavallo effect as D.
F. Cavallo in 1977 had studied the positive correlation between short-run interest rates and inflation
(Van Wijnbergen, 1982, p.133).
Although a handful of studies were carried out to measure the importance of the cost channel
in the 20th century, this was changed dramatically at the beginning of the 21st century. The main
13See Seelig (1974).
14As defined by Seelig (1974), markup pricing implies that firms set their prices at a level which is sufficient to cover
average unit cost plus a markup.
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motivation for this was the price puzzle uncovered in VAR studies in the 1990s. The most commonly
accepted explanation for the price puzzle is the fact that the amount of information available to the
central bank has not been reflected in the variables used in VAR studies (Walsh, 2010, p.22). One
solution to minimise the impact of the price puzzle is to include commodity prices or other asset
prices in the VAR as shown by Sims (1992) and others.15 Although, the inclusion of commodity or
asset prices makes the price increase smaller following a monetary contraction, it does not solve the
puzzle completely (Walsh, 2010, p.23). Under these circumstances, Barth and Ramey (2001) argued
that actually there is no puzzle, but the increase in inflation due to monetary tightening is the result of
the supply-side effects of monetary policy. This idea from Barth and Ramey’s seminal paper paved
the way for much research into the cost channel of monetary policy.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
Most of the existing empirical evidence on the existence and importance of the cost channel sup-
port the cost channel hypothesis. The empirical studies can be broadly divided into four categories:
first, those using VAR studies; second, those using the single equation method; third, those using an
equilibrium model; and fourth, those using firm-level data. What follows is a brief review of such
studies conducted using these methodologies.
First, using a VAR study, Barth and Ramey (2001) carried out an empirical test to examine the
hypothesis that monetary policy shocks have important supply-side effects in addition to demand-
side effects. They assumed, as is the common practice in the literature, working capital has to be
financed externally. Barth and Ramey (2001) considered manufacturing industries in the USA in their
analyses. They found that an increase in the nominal interest rate raises the cost of working capital.
Consequently, monetary tightening works as a positive cost push shock. Barth and Ramey (2001)
further found that the cost channel had been more important during the period from 1959 to 1979
compared to the period from 1983 to 1996. Kim and Lastrapes (2007) examined whether the findings
of Barth and Ramey (2001) were robust to an additional restriction of long-run monetary neutrality.
Kim and Lastrapes (2007) have found even stronger support for the cost channel hypothesis than did
Barth and Ramey (2001) with that restriction. In a broader study, including five OECD countries,
15Proponents of including commodity prices to avoid price puzzles in VAR studies argue that the commodity prices or
asset prices would serve as proxies for some of the monetary authority’s additional information.
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Dedola and Lippi (2005) confirmed above results in a VAR study.
Second, another popular method that has been used to test the importance of the cost channel is
to empirically evaluate the NKPC augmented with the cost of working capital. This method is also
called the single equation method. Ravenna and Walsh (2006), Chowdhury et al. (2006), Tillmann
(2008, 2009b) and Gabriel and Martins (2010) among others have tested the empirical relevance of
the cost channel in this way. In these models, labour is the only factor of production. Ravenna and
Walsh (2006) carried out an empirical study for the USA from 1960 to 2001 using the general method
of moment approach to confirm the importance of the cost channel. Chowdhury et al. (2006) found
significant direct interest rate effects on inflation for the majority of G7 countries. Tillmann (2009b)
found that this channel was most important before 1979, while it was less important after 1979 in
the USA. However, Tillmann also mentioned that the cost channel has regained importance recently.
Contrary to those findings, Gabriel and Martins (2010), recently showed that the cost channel effect
is not significant in the USA, suggesting zero interest rate effects on inflation. They carried out an
empirical study for the period 1960 -2004. Gabriel and Martins (2010) arrived at that conclusion
by employing a newly developed method called efficient inference technique, that is robust to weak
parameter identification.
Third, New Keynesian DSGE models have analysed the importance of the cost channel, yielding
mixed results. Christiano et al. (2005), Christiano et al. (2015) and Castelnuovo (2012) are three such
studies which show that the cost channel is important. Henzel et al. (2009) evaluate the cost channel
in an estimated DSGE model for the euro area. They estimate the model by means of a minimum
distance approach. They show that, an immediate increase in inflation due to monetary tightening is
observed only after incorporating a higher degree of nominal wage rigidity and/or a lower degree of
price rigidity. However, Henzel et al. (2009) fail to produce a price puzzle in an unrestricted DSGE
model. In line with that, in an estimated DSGE model with Bayesian method for the USA, Rabanal
(2007) concludes that the cost channel impact is not significant, as the demand-side effect of monetary
policy is stronger.
Fourth, another way of evaluating the cost channel of monetary policy is using first hand firm-
level data. This method is not popular due to the requirement of extensive micro data. Gaiotti and
Secchi (2006) carried out such a study using data from 2,000 Italian manufacturing firms. The central
conclusion of their study is that the evidence is in favour of the presence of a cost channel. They
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show that the impact of the cost channel is proportional to the amount of working capital held by each
firm. Further, they document that the cost channel is large enough to have nontrivial monetary policy
implications.
The strength of the cost channel of monetary policy depends on how much firms borrow externally
to finance their working capital. Christiano et al. (2015) estimated in a DSGE model that firms
borrow around 56.2% of their total working capital requirements externally. They considered post-
war quarterly USA time series data in the estimation.
2.4 Applications
The cost channel has become an important ingredient in optimising agent models. Fuerst (1992),
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992, 1995) were the first to introduce the idea that firms must borrow to
fund their wage bill in a basic cash-in-advance (CIA) model. These types of model are also called lim-
ited participation models, as all agents cannot participate in financial markets simultaneously. There
are three types of agents in this type of modeling: households, firms and financial intermediaries.
Households can allocate resources between bank deposits and money balances. Money balances are
used to finance consumption. Financial intermediaries lend out their deposits to firms to finance labour
cost. Once households make their decision between bank deposit and money, financial intermediaries
receive lump-sum money injections from the central bank. Only firms and financial intermediaries
can participate in financial markets after money injections. Walsh (2010, p.211) points out that in
these types of model, the interest rate increase generated by the liquidity effect increases the marginal
cost of labour and thereby decreases labour demand. Consequently, equilibrium employment and
output fall.
Contemporary New Keynesian DSGE models have incorporated the cost channel of monetary
policy extensively. As mentioned before, the inclusion of the cost channel in New Keynesian models
introduces a trade-off between stabilising inflation and the output gap. In general, in these models
too, the cost channel is introduced by assuming that the cost of working capital has to be financed
externally intra-period. Among many other applications, a notable initial application of the cost
channel is found in Christiano et al. (2005).
With this brief discussion of the applications of the cost channel completed, I now move to specific
studies. The next chapter is devoted to the study on jobless recovery and the cost channel.
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3 Jobless Recovery, Liquidity Trap, Tight Monetary Policy and
the Cost Channel
3.1 Introduction
Recently, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé and Martín Uribe (2017, SGU henceforth) prescribed a tight
monetary policy during a recession16 to take an economy out of the slump. According to these schol-
ars, this policy prescription is truly unconventional,17 as it is in contrast to the wide consensus that
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies should be implemented during a recession. The main aim
of the present study is to extend the SGU model to incorporate the cost channel of monetary policy
– which incorporates the supply-side effect of monetary policy – and reexamine the robustness of
SGU’s unconventional policy prescription.
The Great Recession officially started during 2007 and ended in 2009. Although the recession is
officially over now, eight years on, unemployment levels in some affected countries have not yet been
stabilised to their pre-crisis levels. In the post-war economic history, the recovery following recession
due to a financial crisis has been mostly jobless or wageless (Calvo et al., 2012). A jobless recovery
is defined as high and persistent unemployment, although following the recession the output growth
has recovered to its pre-crisis level. This has been true for Japan in the 1990s and for many countries
including the USA after the Great Recession.
In the Great Recession, the nominal interest rate fell almost to the zero level in many major
economies due to a series of interest rate cuts by central banks. By having interest rate cuts, central
banks expect a resultant increase in aggregate demand that would stimulate the economy. When the
interest rate is at zero, central banks are reluctant to reduce interest rates any further.18 This is because
a negative nominal interest rate would not motivate potential lenders to lend; rather they would hold
money. This situation is referred to as the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates (ZLB). In such
circumstances, a conventional approach to monetary policy does not work. As agents are indifferent
between holding zero interest rate bonds and holding money, when the interest rate is zero, the central
16The SGU’s policy recommendation was only for recessions casued by a nonfundamental shock. This is discussed
later in the chapter.
17See the PowerPoint presentation of an earlier working paper version (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe,
2012) of the SGU paper available at: https://www.gc.cuny.edu/CUNY_GC/media/CUNY-Graduate-
Center/PDF/Programs/Economics/Seminar%20Fall%202012/slides-11-5-13.pdf (Accessed on 15-06-2016).
18A few central banks including the Bank of Japan have recently reduced nominal short-term interest rates to slightly
below zero, however, this practice is not in commonplace.
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bank fails to stimulate the economy by increasing money supply. This situation is called a liquidity
trap. In such a situation, the real interest rate rises as a result of lower inflation, encouraging household
savings. This would cause output to fall.
The sources of a recession with a liquidity trap can be mainly divided into two, namely: recession
caused by a fundamental shock; and recession caused by a nonfundamental shock. A fundamental
economic shock causes sufficient deflation such that the ZLB on the short-term nominal interest rate
becomes binding. A consumer taste shock can be considered as a fundamental shock. In such a situ-
ation, the consumer tastes shift. For example, consumers might prefer future consumption to current
consumption, which would reduce the current consumption and increase savings. A typical central
bank would now cut the short-term nominal interest rates to encourage consumption and investment
while discouraging savings. The central bank would not be able to stimulate the economy, as much
as required, if the shock is sufficiently severe and the ZLB constrains the central bank’s action. A
lower inflation rate increases real interest rates and households increase their savings. Accordingly, to
equilibrate the savings market, current output has to fall, opening the path to recession (see Mertens
and Ravn, 2014).
On the other hand, a nonfundamental shock is a situation where agents revise their expectations
which produce deflationary pressure. A low-confidence shock can be considered as a nonfundamental
shock. In a low-confidence situation, households expect a persistent drop in income. This revised ex-
pectations can lead to a decrease in current consumption and in higher savings. To stimulate economic
activities, the central bank cuts interest rates. In extreme conditions, due to series of interest rate cuts,
the ZLB binds. The ZLB, accompanied with deflationary expectations, increase real interest rates.
Accordingly, households tend to save more, and so the output must fall, opening the path to recession
(see Mertens and Ravn, 2014).
The type of policy that should be instigated to avoid a jobless recovery has been one of the main
focuses of the literature in the last few decades. The work of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and
Woodford (2012), among others, proposes to increase inflationary expectations in a liquidity trap
to stimulate the economy and create jobs. Eggerston and Woodford (2003) showed that inflationary
expectations can be raised by maintaining short-term interest rates at the zero level for a longer time in
a liquidity trap. However, SGU argue that this policy prescription would not work if the initial shock
which caused the recession was nonfundamental. SGU mention that in a liquidity trap driven by a
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lack-of-confidence shock, the behaviour of agents is different compared to that in normal situations.
In such situations where a liquidity trap is driven by a lack-of-confidence shock, low interest rates
would not increase inflationary expectations, but rather would induce deflation. Therefore, SGU
prescribe an unconventional policy to increase nominal interest rates to the target interest rate in a
liquidity-trapped ZLB situation that is due to a confidence shock. This policy prescription is also
supported by the new but growing literature of neo-fisherianism. The neo-fisherian literature suggests
that central banks can increase private sector inflation expectations in the liquidity trap by increasing
nominal interest rates (see Williamson, 2016).
The SGU policy prescription, according to their model, increases inflationary expectations and
facilitates a recovery with jobs. However, some important elements are absent in their model that
would otherwise affect the economy negatively in a tight monetary policy stance. One such factor
is the financial market. It is widely accepted that financial factors affect economic decisions due
to the existence of information asymmetries (Laeven and Valencia, 2013). For example, the credit
view of the monetary policy transmission argues that financial market imperfections, specifically in-
formational asymmetry in credit markets, worsen during tight monetary periods in adverse economic
conditions (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, 1995).
Related to that, another important element missing in the SGU model is the supply-side effect
of monetary policy, which is generally identified as the cost channel of monetary policy. As shown
by Barth and Ramey (2001), Christiano et al. (2005), and Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and others, the
cost channel of monetary policy has been an important channel to explain the supply-side effect of
monetary policy. To incorporate the cost channel, economists generally assume that firms have to
borrow part or all of their cost of working capital from the financial market. Accordingly, a tight
monetary policy during the recession – as suggested by SGU – in a cost channel economy, may
aggravate the recession. Therefore, it is useful to analyse the impact of the presence of the cost
channel in the SGU set-up.
This study extends the SGU model by incorporating the cost channel of monetary policy and to
reexamine the robustness of the policy conclusions of the SGU study. Further, this study evaluates
two alternative interest rate-based policy options in both cost and no-cost channel economies.
The main findings are as follows: The existence of the cost channel implies that the SGU policy
induces sharp initial contractions in the employment rate and the growth rate and a sharp increase in
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inflation following a lack-of-confidence shock. In the two alternative interest based exit policies, the
following were observed: i) Irrespective of the presence of the cost channel, an alternative policy of
increasing interest rates significantly above the SGU target rate and reduce gradually to target rate
(Overshoot policy) is welfare-wise superior to the SGU policy and, ii) An exit policy characterised
by a staggered interest rate increase (Staggered policy) lowers immediate pain to the economy than
under the SGU policy or Overshoot policy. However, welfare-wise the Staggered policy is inferior to
the other two policies reviewed.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the related literature. First, I
review the literature on jobless recoveries and then review the studies focussing on the policy options
to avoid jobless recoveries. Later, I discuss the SGU study and then the literature which discusses on
issues of tight monetary policy in a recession, focussing on financial markets. Section 3.3 specifies the
model. Section 3.4 calibrates the model to the US economy, performs simulations, welfare analysis
and discusses the results. Section 3.5 concludes the study with a brief discussion.
3.2 Literature Review
In the following literature review, first I discuss the literature on jobless recoveries. Then I review
policy options, including the SGU policy, which are designed to avoid jobless recoveries. Finally, I
discuss the relevant literature on the cost channel.
Jobless Recovery
In two seminal papers, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (Benhabib et al., 2001a,b) have shown
that active interest-rate feedback rules in the spirit of the Taylor rule can easily lead to unexpected
consequences. Specifically, these studies show that there can be multiple steady states with interest-
rate rules, in which, one of the steady states could converge to a liquidity trap. This is what many
countries might have experienced in the Great Recession, i.e. unintended low inflation steady state
with a liquidity trap. One important characteristic of this steady state is, it is jobless.
Economists have attempted to explain the jobless recovery in several ways. First, they associate
the recession with structural changes in the economy. Accordingly, they assume permanent shifts
in the distribution of workers throughout the economy would contribute significantly to the slow job
recovery. Sahin et al. (2012) attribute the slow employment recovery to the mismatch between job
seekers and vacancies in the labour market. Groshen and Potter (2003) argue that the sectors that lost
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jobs during the recession have continued to narrow down during the recovery process. Accordingly,
such unemployed workers had to find new jobs in new industries, which can be time consuming.
Second, many studies have given cyclical explanations for the jobless recovery. One strand of
such literature explains the jobless phenomena as a consequence of real wage rigidities. Shimer
(2012) shows that in the presence of real wages rigidities, a shock to the capital stock can cause a
permanent decline in real economic activities such as employment, output and investment. In this
type of modeling with real rigidities, by construct, monetary policy is inactive and plays no role in the
recovery process. In contrast, some studies have found that labour market outcomes in recoveries are
affected by the monetary policy stance (see McCallum and Smets, 2007). In addition, the empirical
literature suggests that real wage rigidities are not prevalent in the US economy. For example, Daly
et al. (2012) have shown that real wage growth has stayed relatively stable despite the recession and
modest recovery in the US recently.
The other strand of the literature providing cyclical explanations for the jobless recovery is nom-
inal rigidities, especially nominal wage rigidities. Nominal wage rigidities were examined, mainly
due to the above mentioned empirical failures of validating real rigidity models in cyclical explanation
for the jobless recovery. Calvo et al. (2013), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2013) and SGU are the main
proponents of this claim. They have shown that downward nominal wage rigidity makes real wages
too high to be compatible with full employment in a deflationary situation. This causes involuntary
unemployment in the economy.
Last, some scholars explain the jobless recovery by pointing to financial frictions. Calvo et al.
(2012) claim that the contraction of collateral values, which is generally experienced in financial
crises, could be one of the reasons for jobless recoveries. They argue that if profit-maximising firms
are subject to credit constraints of this form, they become more capital intensive as technology grows,
making the recovery jobless.
Policy Options
Any government has two main policy options at their disposal, namely, monetary policy and fiscal
policy, to use in a recession. In the jobless recovery literature, scholars propose policy prescriptions
using both these tools. However, they argue that the exact policy to deploy in the liquidity trap situ-
ation depends mainly on the cause of the recession (see SGU). The cause can be either a fundamental
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shock or a nonfundamental shock. Since recessions caused by nonfundamental shocks are relevant to
the present study, I emphasise such literature in the following.
Mertens and Ravn (2014) studied the effects of fiscal policy interventions in a liquidity trap in a
model with nominal rigidities and an interest rate rule. They show, in a liquidity trap caused by a
nonfundamental shock, higher government spending has deflationary effects that reduce the spending
multiplier when the ZLB is binding. Instead, cuts in marginal labour tax rates are inflationary and
become more expansionary when the ZLB is binding.
Most of the monetary economists recommend that the way out of the jobless recovery is to increase
inflationary expectations (for example, see Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). This has been shown
empirically by Calvo et al. (2013). If the shock is fundamental, expansionary monetary policy, i.e.
keeping interest rates low for a long time, would increase the inflationary expectations of the agents.
However, if the shock is nonfundamental, such expansionary monetary policy may not work. SGU
explain why a low interest rate regime for an extended period may not work in a recession caused
by a nonfundamental shock as: “...in these circumstances the negative relationship between nominal
interest rates and inflationary expectations ceases to be valid and might indeed reverse sign.” (SGU,
p.167). SGU relate their argument to the recent experience of liquidity traps in major economies
and the growing literature about neo-fisherianism. Proponents of the neo-fisherian idea propose that
the Fisher equation19 corresponds to a steady state in which higher interest rates can achieve higher
inflationary expectations (see Williamson, 2016; Cochrane, 2016; Bullard, 2015).
Accordingly, SGU, in their theoretical model, suggest that increasing interest rates to the target
level during a recession would lead to increased inflationary expectations and thus to have a recovery
with jobs.
SGU Model and Financial Markets
The model that SGU builds is in the tradition of Benhabib et al. (2001b). It consists of following
elements: downward nominal wage rigidity, a confidence shock, a Taylor-type interest rate rule and
the ZLB constraint. The model shows that monetary policy can lift the economy from the slump by
increasing nominal interest rates during the recession.
However, the SGU model abstracts from several elements that would otherwise affect the economy
19The Fisher equation says that the nominal interest rate equals the real interest rate plus expected inflation.
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negatively when increasing interest rates. One such element is financial market imperfections. For
example, the presence of information asymmetries may cause financial factors matter real economic
decisions (see Laeven and Valencia, 2013). The credit view of the monetary policy transmission
mechanism states that financial market imperfections worsen during tight monetary periods in adverse
economic conditions (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, 1995).
In relation to financial markets, Mishkin (2013) lists four such main channels, which worsen eco-
nomic conditions due to monetary tightening. They are: the bank lending channel, the balance sheet
channel, the cash flow channel and the unanticipated price level channel. In the bank lending channel,
tight monetary policy lowers bank deposits, which in turn lowers bank lending and investments. The
ultimate result is a reduction in output. The other three channels affect the real economy mainly due
to the asymmetric information effects in the credit markets. For example, in the balance sheet chan-
nel, tight monetary policy reduces stock prices, which in turn increases the moral hazard and adverse
selection issues in the credit market, affecting the lending activity adversely. This reduces investment
and in turn, output. All the credit channels reduce the aggregate demand and output following tight
monetary policy. This fact has been supported by the empirical literature. Recently Jiménez et al.
(2012) showed that higher short-term interest rates reduce credit supply. Further, they show that the
negative effect of higher short-term interest rates on credit availability is stronger for banks with low
capital or liquidity.
Related to that, another important element that is missing in the SGU model is the cost channel
of monetary policy, which is the main focus of the present study. The cost channel may generate
negative economic effect in a tight monetary policy environment. The importance of the cost channel
of monetary policy has been shown extensively both empirically and theoretically by studies such as
Barth and Ramey (2001), Gaiotti and Secchi (2006), Chowdhury et al. (2006) and Ravenna and Walsh
(2006). In early studies, Fuerst (1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992, 1995) introduced the
cost channel in a basic cash-in-advance (CIA) model. Walsh (2010, p.211) pointed out that in these
type of models the interest rate increase generated by the liquidity effect increases the marginal cost
of labour and thereby decreases labour demand. Consequently, equilibrium employment and output
fall. Christiano et al. (2010) constructed an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with the cost
channel without a CIA constraint.
Fiore and Tristani (2013) assumed asymmetric information among banks and firms with regard to
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loan contracts, in addition to incorporating the cost channel of monetary policy in a New Keynesian
model. Among other results, they concluded that worsening financial market conditions increase
the spread of corporate borrowing and adversely affect output and inflation, mainly due to the cost
channel of monetary policy.
3.3 The Model
I extend the SGU model to incorporate the cost of working capital as of Christiano et al. (2010).
Christiano and others assume that both the cost of labour as well as of material input must be financed
at the beginning of the period. However, for simplicity and following much of the literature, I assume
only the cost of labour must be financed at the beginning of the period. The model consists of four
main types of agents, namely, households, production, monetary authority and fiscal authority.
3.3.1 Households
There is a large number of identical infinitely-lived households in the economy. These house-
holds supply labour inelastically, without any opportunity cost. The preferences of a representative
household are described by the following objective function, while the household seeks to maximise
utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
eξtβtU(Ct), (3.1)
where ξt is an exogenous taste shock, which is an iid random variable with unit variance and zero
mean. β ∈ {0, 1) is a subjective rate of discount. The smaller β is, the less the household values
future consumption relative to current consumption. Ct denotes real consumption at time t. U is the
utility function assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave. More specifically, the utility
function is assumed to be:
U(C) =
C1−σ − 1
1− σ , (3.2)
where σ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
The household budget constraint is:
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PtCt +Bt + Tt = W
n
t ht +Rt−1Bt−1 + Φt, (3.3)
where Pt denotes the price of the consumption good in period t, Bt represents the quantity of one
period nominal risk-free discount bonds purchased in period t and maturing in period t + 1. Rt is
the gross nominal interest rate earned for government bonds for holding from period t to t + 1. W nt
denotes the nominal wage rate, ht denotes the hours employed by households and Φt is nominal
profits received in time t from the ownership of firms and financial intermediaries. Tt is the nominal
lump sum taxes paid by the household in time t.
Although households supply labour inelastically, they are only able to supply ht ≤ h¯ hours of
labour in each period due to nominal wage rigidities. Households are endowed with a constant number
of maximum hours of work, h¯ per period.
The Maximisation Problem of a Representative Household
The optimisation problem of the household is to maximise the objective function given by Equa-
tion (3.1) subject to the budget constraint given by Equation (3.3) as given below:
Max{Ct,Bt}E0
∞∑
t=0
eξtβtU(Ct),
subject to:
PtCt +Bt + Tt − [W nt ht +Rt−1Bt−1 + Φt] = 0.
Further, it is assumed that the household is constrained from engaging in Ponzi type schemes as
follows:
limj→∞Et
(
j∏
s=0
(R−1t+s)Bt+j+1 ≥ 0
)
.
The Lagrangian method is used to solve the household’s constrained optimisation problem. Accord-
ingly, the Lagrangian problem is:
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
eξtβt {U(Ct)− λt [PtCt +Bt + Tt − (W nt ht +Rt−1Bt−1 + Φt)]} , (3.4)
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where λt is the Lagrange multiplier.
First Order Necessary Conditions for Maximisation
In an interior solution, to derive the first order conditions, it is necessary to set equal to zero the
partial derivatives of the function (3.4) with respect to the choice variables,Bt andCt.When Equation
(3.4) is concave in these variables, the necessary conditions are also sufficient for maximisation.
First, consider the partial derivative with respect to Ct:
∂L
∂Ct
= eξtβt [Uc,t − λt(Pt)] = 0,
λt =
Uc,t
Pt
,
where Uc,t is the first derivative of the utility function with respect to consumption at time t.
Now consider the partial derivative with respect to Bt:
∂L
∂Bt
= −eξtβtλt + Et
(
eξt+1βt+1Rtλt+1
)
= 0,
λt = Et
(
eξt+1βRtλt+1
eξt
)
.
Using the above results with regard to the Lagrange multiplier, it is possible to derive the following
equation:
Uc,t
Pt
= Et
(
eξt+1βRt
eξt
Uc,t+1
Pt+1
)
,
eξtUc,t = βRtEt
(
eξt+1Uc,t+1
pit+1
)
,
where pit+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
is gross inflation, which gives the change in the price level between period t and
t + 1 , i.e., the gross rate of inflation between period t and t + 1. The above equation represents the
Euler equation for the maximisation problem of the household. Given Uc,t = C−σt , the Euler equation
can be re-written as follows:
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eξtC−σt = βRtEt
(
eξt+1C−σt+1
pit+1
)
. (3.5)
The Euler equation states that the marginal benefit of the bond equals to the marginal cost of the
bond.
3.3.2 Production Sector
Firms in this model use no capital in the production process and exist in competitive product and
labour markets. Each firm produces a homogeneous product using the following technology:
Yt = XtF (ht),
where Xt denotes the deterministic trend in productivity, assumed to be common to all firms in the
market. Productivity grows at the constant exogenous gross rate of µ ≥ 1. Accordingly,
Xt = µXt−1. (3.6)
It is assumed that the production technology satisfies decreasing returns to scale and takes the
following form:
F (h) = hα,
where α ∈ (0, 1).
Borrowing for Working Capital
In this economy, firms have to borrow for working capital. This is the main departure point of
this study from SGU. The worker sells labour services ht to firms, but firms must pay wages prior
to receiving the sales proceeds of production. To accomplish this, firms must take out exogenous
loans from competitive financial intermediaries, which are owned by households. Accordingly, the
wage-in-advance constraint in nominal terms is:
qnt ≥ JW nt ht, (3.7)
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where qnt is nominal loans taken out from the financial intermediary. In this set-up, I assume firms
may not ask for loans to cover their full wage bill. That is, they may finance part of their wage bill
internally. Accordingly, J denotes the portion of the wage bill covered by firms using external loans.
It is assumed that J is fixed over time. If J = 0, that means the firm does not ask for any loans to
cover the wage bill. This situation is identical to the SGU model. However, if J = 1, firms borrow
the full wage bill externally. I consider values between 0 and 1, inclusive, for J .
Since firms borrow their wage bill externally, they have to incur an interest bill. The gross rate of
interest is Rt, which is the rate for nominal bonds. I assume the corporate interest rate is the same as
the risk free interest rate. Accordingly, nominal profits for a representative firm are:
Φt = PtXtF (ht)− [W nt ht + qnt (Rt − 1)] . (3.8)
The Maximisation Problem of a Representative Firm
A representative firm in this economy has two choice variables: ht and qnt . The optimisation
problem of a representative firm is to maximise the profit given by Equation (3.8) subject to the
wage-in-advance constraint given by Equation (3.7). Accordingly, in each period, the problem is:
Max{ht,qnt } = PtXtF (ht)− [W nt ht + qnt (Rt − 1)] ,
subject to:
qnt ≥ JW nt ht.
The firm’s constrained optimisation problem is solved using the Lagrangian method. The Lag-
rangian of the problem is:
L = PtXtF (ht)− [W nt ht + qnt (Rt − 1)]− δt [JW nt ht − qnt ] , (3.9)
where δt is the Lagrange multiplier.
First Order Necessary Conditions for Maximisation
In an interior solution, to derive the first order conditions, it is necessary to set equal to zero the
partial derivatives of Equation (3.9) with respect to the choice variables, ht and qnt .
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First, consider the partial derivative with respect to ht:
∂L
∂ht
= PtXtF
′
(ht)−W nt − δtW nt J = 0,
PtXtF
′
(ht) = W
n
t (1 + δtJ) .
Now consider the partial derivative with respect to qnt :
∂L
∂qnt
= −(Rt − 1) + δt = 0,
Using these results, it is possible to write:
PtXtF
′
(ht) = W
n
t [1 + J(Rt − 1)] ,
or
F
′
(ht) =
W nt
PtXt
[1 + J(Rt − 1)] .
The last equation shows how competitive firms equate the marginal product of labour to the real
marginal cost. This equation further shows, everything else being constant, an increase in the nom-
inal interest rate increases the marginal cost of labour. To equate the marginal cost of labour to the
marginal product of labour, firms have to reduce employment, as the production function has the char-
acteristic of decreasing returns to scale. Therefore, in this model, an increase in the nominal interest
rate implies a reduction in output, ceteris paribus.
3.3.3 Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
Nominal wages are assumed to be downwardly rigid, as in SGU. In any given period, nominal
wages can fall by at most the factor γ(ut), where ut = h¯−hth¯ is the employment ratio in the economy.
Nominal wage dynamics take the following form:
W nt ≥ γ(ut)W nt−1,
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where γ(ut) ≥ 1 represents an absolute wage rigidity and γ(ut) = 0 represents full wage flexibility.
Here, it is assumed that nominal wages become more flexible when unemployment increases, form-
ally: γ′(ut) < 0. Also, it is assumed γ(0) > β˜µ where β˜ = βµ−σ. The latter assumption ensures
both the existence of a steady state with unemployment and the uniqueness of the steady state with
full employment.
The nominal wage rigidity function, γ(ut), is assumed to take the following form: γ(ut) = γ0(1−
ut)
γ1 where γ0 and γ1 are positive constants.
The following slackness condition is imposed on wage and employment:
(h¯− ht)
[
W nt − γ(ut)W nt−1
]
= 0.
This condition confirms that whenever there is involuntary unemployment, the lower bound on
the nominal wage is binding. On the other hand, whenever nominal wages are not bound by its lower
bound, the economy is at the full employment level.
3.3.4 The Government and the Monetary Authority
The government consumes no goods, but raises taxes and issues public debt. The budget constraint
of the government is therefore given by:
Bt + Tt = Rt−1Bt−1.
A no-Ponzi game constraint is also imposed on the government.
Monetary policy confirms that the nominal interest rate is bounded below by zero and takes the
following Taylor rule:
Rt = Max
[
1, R∗ + αpi(pit − pi∗) + αyln
(
Yt
Y ∗t
)]
,
where pi∗ is the inflation target, R∗, αpi and αy are positive constants. Y ∗t = Xth¯
α is the flexible
wage level of employment. Following SGU, it is assumed that (i) R∗ = pi
∗
β˜
> 1, which ensures the
compatibility of the inflation target with the deterministic steady state, (ii) αpiβ˜ > 1, which is the
Taylor principle and (iii) pi∗ > γ(0)
µ
, which is necessary for the existence of a steady state with full
employment.
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3.3.5 Equilibrium
Since the model abstracts from aggregate demand components like capital, investments, govern-
ment purchases and net exports, the goods market clearing condition is given by:
Ct = XtF (ht),
which confirms that all the output must be consumed. Real consumption and real wages are scaled
down by the deterministic productivity trend: ct = CtXt and wt =
Wnt
PtXt
.
The real consumption in the Euler equation given by (3.5) is scaled down by the deterministic
trend to obtain:
eξtc−σt =
(
Xt
Xt+1
)
−σβRtEt
(
eξt+1c−σt+1
pit+1
)
,
and by substituting productivity growth µ as given in Equation (3.6) yields:
eξtc−σt = µ
−σβRtEt
(
eξt+1c−σt+1
pit+1
)
.
Finally, substituting β˜, yields:
eξtc−σt = β˜RtEt
(
eξt+1c−σt+1
pit+1
)
. (3.10)
Accordingly, a competitive equilibrium is satisfied by Equation (3.10) and the following set of
equations:
ct = F (ht), (3.11)
F
′
(ht) = wt [1 + J(Rt − 1)] , (3.12)
ht ≤ h¯t, (3.13)
wt ≥ γ(ut)wt−1
µpit
, (3.14)
(h¯− ht)
[
wt − γ(ut)wt−1
µpit
]
= 0, (3.15)
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ut =
h¯− ht
h¯
, (3.16)
Rt = Max
[
1,
pi∗
β˜
+ αpi(pit − pi∗) + αyln
(
F (ht)
F (h¯)
)]
. (3.17)
3.3.6 Non-stochastic Steady State Equilibria
At the steady state all variables are constant over time. Accordingly, the steady state values of real
consumption, real wages, employment, nominal interest rate and inflation are given by c, w, h,R and
pi, respectively. In this specification, real consumption and real wages are adjusted for the productivity
trend, as was done in the equilibrium specification above. The exogenous taste shock ξt takes the
value of zero. In the steady state, the system of equations specified in the equilibrium simplifies to
the following set of equations:
R =
pi
β˜
, (3.18)
c = F (h), (3.19)
F
′
(h) = w[1 + J(R− 1)], (3.20)
h ≤ h¯, (3.21)
pi ≥ γ(u)
µ
, (3.22)
(h¯− h)(1− γ(u)
µpi
) = 0, (3.23)
u =
h¯− h
h¯
, (3.24)
R = Max
{
1,
pi∗
β˜
+ αpi(pi − pi∗) + αyln
(
F (h)
F (h¯)
)}
. (3.25)
In the following two propositions, the proof for which are supplied in Appendix A.1, I show that
there exist two steady states in the cost channel economy, as in the SGU economy. The first one
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is the intended full employment steady state while the other one is the unintended steady state with
unemployment.
Proposition 1
There exists a unique full employment steady state for any J ∈ [0, 1]. At this steady state, inflation
rate equals inflation target pi∗ and R = pi
∗
β˜
.
Proof: See Appendix A.1
At the full employment steady state, the real wage is determined by the following equation, which
is derived from Equation (3.20):
w =
F
′
(h¯)[
1 + J
(
pi∗
β˜
− 1
)] .
Everything else being constant, the above equation shows that the full employment steady state
real wage is determined by the value of J .
Proposition 2
There exists a unique unemployment steady state for any J ∈ [0, 1]. At this steady state, the
economy is in a liquidity trap with R = 1 and pi = β˜.
Proof: See Appendix A.1
At the unemployment steady state, the real wage is determined by the following equation, which
is derived from Equation (3.20):
w = F
′
(h).
This equation shows that real wages in the unemployment steady state are not affected by J.
Further, no variable in the model is affected by J in the unemployment steady state. The reason
for this is, in the unemployment steady state the nominal interest rate becomes zero and the firm’s
borrowings are costless, as per the model assumptions. Therefore, borrowing for working capital
does not affect the real wages in the unemployment steady state.
The two propositions show that J is affected in the full employment steady state but not in the
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unemployment steady state.
3.4 Simulations and Welfare Analysis
In this section, I consider model simulations and welfare analysis.20 The simulation is divided
into two sections, namely, baseline simulation and the simulation of alternative interest rate-based
exit strategies. I start with the baseline calibration and simulation, then describe and present the
results of the welfare analysis before moving to alternative exit strategies.
3.4.1 Baseline Simulation
To facilitate the simulation exercise, I first calibrate parameters. I use the parameter values in the
standard range used in the previous literature and also used by SGU. The parameter values are set as
follows: coefficient of relative risk aversion σ to 1.25, output elasticity of labour α to 0.75, exogenous
productivity growth µ to 2% per annum, long run real interest rate β˜ to 4% per annum, inflation target
pi∗ to 2% per annum and the parameters of the Taylor rule αpi to 1.5 and αy to 0.125. The elasticity of
the wage rigidity with respect to unemployment γ1 is set at 0.1942, following SGU. SGU calculated
γ1 assuming nominal wages fall frictionlessly by 2% per annum at an unemployment rate of 5%. The
parameter used for downward rigidity factor γ0 is set at pi∗.
In the baseline simulation exercise, I examine the dynamics of a cost channel economy and a no-
cost channel economy following a confidence shock. First, I examine the dynamics of the economy
moving to an unintended unemployment steady state following a confidence shock. Second, I examine
the dynamics of the economy following the implementation of the SGU exit strategy.
In this analysis, following SGU, I assume a confidence shock reduces inflation expectations.
Quantitatively, it is assumed that this confidence shock results in a drop in inflation by 10 basis points
from the target rate in Quarter 1. I consider a perfect foresight equilibrium path. The frequency of the
simulation period is quarterly.
20 I used the software Matlab (version R2015b) to facilitate simulations and the welfare analysis.
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3.4.1.1 Unintended Unemployment Steady State In this section, I consider the dynamics of the
economy moving to an unintended steady state following a lack-of-confidence shock.
Consider an economy which is at the full employment steady state at the beginning. Then, a con-
fidence shock (pi1 < pi∗) is introduced in Quarter 1. This shock takes the economy into an unintended
steady state with a liquidity trap. Figure 3.1 depicts the dynamics. Appendix A.2 shows the steps to
solve the exact dynamics of the non-linear model.
Figure 3.1: Contraction with a Jobless Recovery
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In Figure 3.1, the solid line depicts the dynamics of the case when the cost channel is active (i.e.,
J = 1) while the dashed line depicts the dynamics of the case where the cost channel is not active
(i.e., J = 0, which is identical to the SGU model). The economy begins at full employment, while
inflation and nominal interest rates are at their target rates. Output is growing at the long-term growth
rate of 2%. Following the confidence shock in Quarter 1, inflation decreases monotonically. The
Taylor rule responds to the decrease in inflation by reducing interest rates. When the cost channel is
active, the interest rate hits its lower bound in 3.25 years, otherwise it occurs in 3.75 years. The reason
that the economy hits the ZLB early when the cost channel is included, is explained as follows: When
the cost channel is active, a decrease in nominal interest rates reduces the marginal cost of production,
making firms hire relatively more people to equate the real marginal cost of production to the marginal
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product of labour. This allows for an increase in current consumption relative to the previous period
and reduces inflation more relative to the case when the cost channel is not active. A large drop
in inflation leads the central bank to cut nominal rates further through the Taylor rule. Ultimately,
the interest rate hits the lower bound in 3.25 years from the initial shock. The dynamics show that
the economy with a cost channel ultimately converges to the unintended unemployment steady state,
which is identical to the SGU model.
3.4.1.2 The SGU Exit Strategy In this section, I consider the implementation of the SGU exit
strategy when the economy is at the unintended unemployment steady state.
Consider the case that the economy is at the unintended steady state. At the beginning of Quarter
1, the nominal interest rate is at the ZLB, inflation is at its lower bound (β˜), unemployment is high,
while output is growing at its long-term growth rate of 2%. Under these conditions, the monetary
authority implements the SGU exit strategy, i.e. they set the net nominal interest rate at their target
rate of 6% in Quarter 2 and maintain it. The dynamics of the interest rate shock are depicted in Figure
3.2. The dashed line shows the dynamics of the no-cost channel economy (J = 0) while the solid line
shows the dynamics of the cost channel economy (J = 1). The dotted line depicts a more empirically
relevant value of J = 0.6.21 The interest rate shock to the economy initially affects firms’ marginal
cost, as firms have to borrow to pay wages. Since the marginal cost increases significantly and firms
are always on their labour demand curve, firms have no option but to cut employment to equate
the real marginal cost to the marginal product of labour. The employment cut by firms affects the
current employment level and production of firms, consequently negatively affecting the economy-
wide employment and output growth in Quarter 2. This was not observed under the SGU model,
where J = 0, as depicted in Figure 3.2. It is clear from the Euler equation that a drop in current
consumption relative to the previous period consumption, increases current inflation. This effect is
evident in the dynamics, which shows that inflation picks up significantly in Quarter 2. However,
moving into Quarter 3, the relative effect of the cost channel between Quarter 2 and 3 becomes null as
the interest rate is unchanged. Inflation drops again in Quarter 3, before increasing monotonically to
its target value. Employment too increases monotonically to its target value after the sudden drop in
21As mentioned before, Christiano et al. (2015) estimated that firms borrowed around 56.2% of their working capital
externally in the post-war USA economy. Accordingly, I consider the more empirically relevant value of J = 0.6.
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Quarter 2. Output growth picks up in Quarter 3 and decreases monotonically to its long-term growth
rate.
This analysis shows that the SGU exit strategy induces a substantial initial pain to the economy,
although the strategy is able to take the economy out of slump in a cost channel economy.
Figure 3.2: Dynamics of the SGU Exit Strategy when the Economy is in the Unintended Steady State
with a Liquidity Trap
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In the next section, I analyse the welfare implications.
3.4.2 Welfare Analysis
The simulation exercises performed in the above section to analyse the dynamics of the economy
showed that there is a significant reduction in employment and output growth following a sharp in-
crease in the nominal interest rate in a cost channel economy. This section considers the implication
of the SGU exit strategy for household welfare in both cost channel and no-cost channel economies.
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The Methodology
In the following analysis, I compare welfare due to different policy options and under different
economic environments. The welfare calculation method is in the tradition of Robert E. Lucas (see
Lucas, 2003). The method is called consumption equivalent of welfare comparison, which is based on
the aggregate utility of households. The welfare of a household with perfect foresight is formulated
as follows:
∞∑
t=2
βt−2
(
C1−σt − 1
)
1− σ .
Consumption equivalent welfare is measured as the change in consumption due to policy option or
the economic environment. It is calculated by solving the following non-linear equation for x. Here,
x ∗ 100 is the additional percentage of consumption required in the unintended steady state22 to have
the same level of welfare in the policy consumption path (The detailed derivation of the consumption
equivalent welfare measure is given in Appendix A.3):
wf =
1
1− σ
(
[cuss (1 + x)
1−σ]
1− βµ1−σ −
1
1− β
)
,
where wf is the welfare of the policy action, cuss is the real consumption in the unintended steady
state scaled down by the productivity growth.
Welfare Implications of the SGU Exit Strategy
In this section, the welfare implication of the SGU exit policy in a cost channel and a no-cost
channel economy is considered. Table 3.1 presents consumption equivalence welfare and other eco-
nomic measures in each case. The table shows that the welfare level decreases when the cost channel
is introduced to the model. Further, as found in the simulation exercise above, significant contraction
in the initial employment level and in output growth is also observed in a cost channel economy com-
pared to a no-cost channel economy. As depicted in Figure 3.2, these contractions occur just after the
introduction of the SGU exit policy.
22Note that the welfare level is identical irrespective of the value of J in the unintended steady state. This is because,
at the unintended steady state, net nominal interest rate is at the zero level.
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Table 3.1: Welfare and Economic Measures of SGU Exit Policy
Economic Measure Without Cost Channel (J = 0) With Cost Channel (J = 1)
Consumption Equivalent Welfare 0.0379 0.0377
Maximum Unemployment 4.92 5.93
Maximum Inflation 2 2
Minimum Output Growth 1.98 -1.22
Two alternative interest rate strategies are considered in the following section to analyse two
different issues described below.
3.4.3 Alternative Interest-rate based Exit Strategies
In this section, I examine two alternative interest rate-based exit strategies. First, I study an
overshoot interest rate policy. This strategy examines whether the quantitative increase in nominal
interest rates in the SGU exit policy is optimal. Then, I study a staggered interest rate increase
policy. This strategy examines whether it is possible to reduce the initial pain to the economy in
the cost channel economy as the cost channel worsens the initial economic conditions just after the
introduction of the SGU exit strategy.
3.4.3.1 Alternative Exit Policy 1 - Overshoot Policy In the Overshoot policy, I propose to in-
crease the interest rate above the level of the target rate of 6% (overshoot). This alternative policy
has also been proposed by Roberto M. Billi in his discussion of the SGU paper (see Billi, 2013).23
Under this policy, I propose to increase the interest rate to above the level of the target rate in Quarter
2. Then reduce interest rates to the long-run target level in a step-wise fashion in eight quarters and
maintain the target level thereafter. In this analysis, I examine several Overshoot policies based on
the interest rate increase and the SGU policy in a no-cost channel economy with regard to welfare and
other economic conditions. The results are given in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Welfare of SGU Exit Policy and Overshoot Interest Rate Policies (J = 0)
Economic Measure
Interest Rate Overshoot Policy (in terms of net nominal values)
6% (SGU Policy) 7% 8% 10% 25% 50%
Consumption Equivalent Welfare 0.0379 0.0380 0.0381 0.0382 0.0384 0.0384
Maximum Unemployment 4.9237 4.9237 4.9237 4.9237 4.9237 4.9237
Maximum Inflation 2 2.1106 2.4615 3.8846 15.6442 38.95
Minimum Output Growth 1.9852 1.9852 1.9852 1.9852 1.9852 1.9852
23The Roberto M. Billi’s discussion is based on an earlier version of the SGU paper: Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012).
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Table 3.2 shows that in the SGU economy (no-cost channel economy), the welfare-wise better
interest rate strategy is not to increase the interest rate to its long-run target level of 6%, but to increase
more and reduce in a step-wise fashion. This result shows that the SGU exit strategy is inferior with
regard to consumption equivalent welfare value.
However, the higher the increase in interest rates, the larger the violation of the inflation target
initially. For example, if the central bank decides to increase nominal interest rates suddenly to 10%,
Table 3.2 shows that initial increase in inflation would be 3.88%, or 188 basis points above the target
value of 2%.
Moreover, I consider the welfare analysis to find the optimum level of nominal interest rate in-
crease in cost channel and no-cost channel economies under the Overshoot policy. The focus here
is only on welfare of households but not on other economic measures such as breach of the inflation
target, initial reduction of output growth. Figure 3.3 depicts nominal interest rates versus welfare in
economies with and without cost channel. It shows that the welfare of the cost channel economy is
always lower to the no-cost channel economy for any given nominal interest rate. In addition, the op-
timal level of the nominal interest rate to achieve maximum welfare level is also lower in cost channel
economies than in no-cost channel economies.
Further, in the cost channel economy, the welfare level is non-monotonic in the nominal interest
rate. The welfare level increases up to a certain level of interest rate (around 26%), and then begins
to decrease in cost channel economies. This is because the negative effect of the initial increase in
inflation and also of the decrease in output growth due to the cost channel, exceeds at that point, over
positive effects.
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Figure 3.3: Nominal Interest Rates Vs Welfare
However, according to Figure 3.3, under the Overshoot policy, welfare-maximising initial increase
in the interest rate is absolutely high: a staggering 34% in the original SGU setting and a somewhat
lower 26% in the model with the cost channel. This could be due to the missing elements in my
analysis (as well as in SGU model), which is briefly discussed in the conclusion section. Therefore,
these results in nominal terms are to be interpreted with care.
In the comparison analysis of the three interest rate-based strategies reported later in Section
3.4.3.3, I consider an 8% increase in the Overshoot policy taking into account the welfare level as
well as the initial increase in inflation.
3.4.3.2 Alternative Exit Policy 2 - Staggered Policy Since both the SGU exit strategy as well
as the Overshoot strategy discussed in the section above worsen economic conditions initially, this
section considers a second alternative exit strategy, which is named as the Staggered policy. Under
this policy, the monetary authority increases interest rates to its long-run target value in a staggered
fashion. This type of monetary policy was implemented by the Fed during the period from 2004
to 2006, when it increased nominal interest rates by 4% in eight quarters. During that period, on
average, the Fed has increased interest rates by 0.5% quarterly. Under the Staggered policy, I propose
to increase the interest rate by 75 basis points in each of eight consecutive quarters to reach its target
value of 6%. The economy is at the unintended steady state at the beginning, i.e., in Quarter 1, before
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introducing the alternative strategy in Quarter 2. The dynamics of the Staggered policy and the SGU
exit policy in a cost channel economy are depicted in Figure 3.4. It is clear from the dynamics of
the employment rate and output growth rate that the initial pain of contraction of employment, output
growth and increase in inflation is substantially less in the Staggered policy compared to the SGU
policy in a cost channel economy.
Figure 3.4: Dynamics of Staggered Interest Policy and SGU Policy
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3.4.3.3 Comparison of the Three Exit Strategies Welfare and other economic conditions of the
three exit strategies under examination, namely the SGU policy, the Overshoot interest rate policy24
and the Staggered policy are given in Table 3.3. The table confirms that the better monetary policy
strategy in a no-cost channel economy (when J = 0) is to increase the interest rate to 8%, i.e. two
percentage points above the target rate of 6%. However, in a cost channel economy (consider J = 1),
24As mentioned before, I consider the initial increase of interest rate as 8% under the Overshoot policy, considering
the initial pain to the economy of an even higher initial increase in interest rates. Note that the welfare-wise optimal level
of an initial increase in a no-cost channel economy is 34% and the value for a cost channel economy is 26%, as shown
above.
38
3.5 Conclusion
the answer is not straight forward. In cost channel economies, although the welfare is maximised in
the Overshoot policy, initial economic conditions given by minimum level of unemployment, max-
imum inflation and maximum unemployment are worse compared to conditions under the other two
strategies.
Table 3.3: Comparison of Welfare and Economic Measures in the Three Policy Strategies
Exit Strategy Amount of Wage Bill to be Borrowed
J=0 J=0.25 J=0.5 J=0.75 J=1 % Change (bet. J=0 & J=1)
SGU Exit Policy
Welfare 0.0379 0.0379 0.0378 0.0378 0.0377 -0.53
Max. Unemp. 4.9237 5.1786 5.4319 5.6835 5.9336 1.01
Max. Inf. 2 2 2 2 2 -
Min. Out. Gr. 1.9852 1.1766 0.3726 -0.4268 -1.2217 -3.21
Welfare 0.0381 0.0380 0.0380 0.0379 0.0379 -0.52
Overshoot Policy Max. Unemp. 4.9237 5.2565 5.5865 5.9138 6.2384 1.31
Int. Rate inc. 8% Max. Inf. 2.4615 2.4615 2.4615 2.4615 2.4615 -
Min. Out. Gr. 1.9852 0.9294 -0.1185 -1.1587 -2.1912 -4.18
Staggered Policy
Welfare 0.0373 0.0373 0.0372 0.0372 0.0371 -0.54
Max. Unemp. 4.9237 4.9558 4.9880 5.0201 5.0521 0.13
Max. Inf. 2 2 2 2 2 -
Min. Out. Gr. 1.9852 1.8832 1.7813 1.6795 1.5778 -0.41
3.5 Conclusion
In this study, I extended the SGU model to incorporate the cost channel of monetary policy and
reexamined the robustness of SGU’s unconventional policy prescription. SGU recommended imple-
menting a tight monetary policy in a liquidity-trapped recession followed by a nonfundamental shock.
The present model for a cost channel economy has two steady states: one is the intended steady state
with full employment and the other one is the unintended steady with unemployment. This result is
identical to the SGU study for a no-cost channel economy.
The simulation exercise confirmed that the exit strategy suggested by SGU is able to take the
economy out of the slump even when the cost channel of monetary policy is present in the economy.
However, the SGU exit strategy takes the cost channel economy to the full employment steady state
with some initial pain compared to the no-cost channel economy. The unexpected increase in the
nominal interest rate, as suggested by SGU, would induce sharp initial contractions in the employment
rate and the growth rate and a sharp increase in inflation in a cost channel economy. In line with this
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result, the welfare analysis showed that the welfare of economic agents in a cost channel economy is
less compared to that of economic agents in a no-cost channel economy under the SGU exit policy.
Two alternative interest rate-based exit policies were also explored. First, the Overshoot policy
suggests increasing interest rates above the long-run target interest rate considered by SGU and re-
ducing it to the target rate in a step-wise fashion. The welfare analysis showed that the SGU policy
is inferior compared to the Overshoot policy, irrespective of the cost channel. Under the Overshoot
policy, the welfare-maximising initial increase in interest rates is absolutely high: a staggering 34%
in the original SGU setting and somewhat lower at 26% in the model with the cost channel.
Second, the Staggered policy suggests a step-wise increase in interest rates, rather than sudden
large increase as suggested by the SGU exit policy. The following results hold, irrespective of the
cost channel: Under the Staggered policy, the initial pain to the economy in terms of other economic
conditions such as unemployment, economic growth and inflation is lower than under the SGU policy
or the Overshoot policy. However, welfare-wise, the Staggered policy is inferior, compared to the
other two policies considered.
In this analysis, I have included only the cost channel of monetary policy in the model as a negative
effect of the sudden increase in nominal interest rates (as prescribed by the SGU) in a recession.
However, there are several other factors that would negatively affect the welfare of the household in
such a situation. For example, an increase in nominal interest rates would negatively affect: cost of
existing borrowing contracts, borrowing constraints faced by firms due to decline in the net worth of
the firm and subsistence levels of consumption. Therefore, the welfare calculated in this study under
the SGU exit policy and the other two alternative policies may be overestimated.
I have considered a perfect foresight equilibrium path in the analysis. The main reason to choose
the perfect foresight assumption, beside the simplicity, was to compare results with the SGU study.
SGU, in their analysis, consider a perfect foresight equilibrium path.
Two possible extensions to this research in the future, worth noting. First, how the cost channel
economy would react to the SGU policy under a fundamental shock would be interesting to analyse.
Second, how the results would change if capital is incorporated into the economy would be interesting
to consider.
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4 Optimal Monetary Policy in the Presence of the Zero Lower
Bound on Nominal Interest Rates in a Cost Channel Economy
4.1 Introduction25
The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (ZLB) is no longer just a theoretical interest. Nominal
interest rates were at zero lower bound in the recent past in many countries across the globe, including
the USA and Japan.26 It has been widely debated recently what a central bank should do to stimulate
the economy when the aggregate demand is weak, even when the nominal interest rate is at the
zero level.27 Optimal commitment monetary policy literature suggests monetary policy inertia, i.e.
committing to continue a zero interest regime even after the ZLB is not binding, is a way to get the
economy out of recession. In this chapter, I examine whether this result holds when the economy has
a cost channel of monetary policy. In addition, I examine the optimal discretionary policy in a cost
channel economy.
In the optimal monetary policy literature, there are two main policies which attempt to stabilise
the economy in terms of inflation and the output gap following a shock to the economy. They are
known as discretionary policy and commitment policy. Under discretion, the central bank takes the
current state of the economy and private sector expectations as given. Under this policy, the central
bank optimises in each period; therefore, any promises given by the bank are not credible. On the
other hand, under commitment policy, the central bank chooses a path for current and future inflation
as well as the output gap and commits to that. Therefore, under commitment, if the central bank
is credible, it can adjust private sector expectations (see Walsh, 2010, pp.357-364). Nobel laureates
Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, in their seminal paper “Rules Rather than Discretion: The
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans”,28 showed how an announcement of commitment to a low inflation
regime by monetary authorities might create lower private sector inflationary expectations. They
25I would like to thank Yuki Teranishi for sharing the Matlab code used in the analysis of their paper Jung et al. (2005).
This code was helpful to develop the Matlab code for the analysis of this chapter. Further, I thank Teranishi for valuable
comments and suggestions that improved the chapter.
26As mentioned before, in this thesis I consider short-term nominal interest rates are to be constrained by the zero lower
bound, unless otherwise specified.
27During the past decade, central banks around the world, including the Federal Reserve Bank of the USA, had to resort
to unconventional monetary policies due to the ZLB constraint. Two such major unconventional policies that have been
considered are forward guidance and balance sheet policies. However, in this chapter, my focus is only on the conventional
monetary policy with the interest rate instrument.
28Kydland and Prescott (1977).
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argued that if this monetary policy is then changed and interest rates are reduced to give a short-term
lift to employment, the credibility of policymakers will be lost and economic conditions may worsen.
The commitment of the central bank to future actions and informing the public of them in the form
of forward guidance29 at the ZLB is supported by a large body of literature, starting with Krugman
(1998). Although John Maynard Keynes was the first to raise the question of the ZLB in the context of
the Great Depression, it was of only theoretical interest until Japan faced the ZLB constraint in reality
in the 1990s. Krugman, in his seminal work in 1998, recommended that central banks to commit to
credible promises to the public about having higher inflation in the future. Since then, scholars such
as Jung, Teranishi and Watanabe (2005, henceforth JTW), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Adam
and Billi (2006) and Nakov (2008), among others, using more complex dynamic forward looking
models, have confirmed the findings of Krugman.
However, the optimal monetary policy literature at the ZLB thus far has abstracted an important
characteristic of the economy, i.e. the supply-side effect of monetary policy. Supply-side effects, in
general, are incorporated with the cost channel of monetary policy. Most recently, Chattopadhyay and
Ghosh (2016) conducted a study on optimal monetary policy at the ZLB in a cost channel economy
with varying degrees of interest rate pass-through. Their methodology was similar to the methodology
used in this chapter and they have reported results similar to mine.30
The cost channel is said to be present in an economy if the changes in nominal interest rates affect
the supply-side of the economy. In general, the cost channel makes changes directly to the current in-
flation and to the current output gap due to changes in nominal interest rates. In addition to that, when
the cost channel is present in the economy, it may affect future inflationary expectations if the monet-
ary authority commits to a future monetary policy in a liquidity-trapped recession. Consequently, the
presence of the cost channel may affect optimal monetary policy at the ZLB.
The main objective of this chapter is to examine the central bank’s optimal monetary policy op-
tions at the ZLB in a cost channel economy. Specifically, this study inquires when the central bank
should exit the zero nominal interest rate regime. In this regard, I consider both discretionary and com-
mitment policies, although the study’s main focus is on commitment policies. I consider a variation
of the standard New Keynesian model to accomplish the above objective. To carry out simulations, I
calibrate the model to the US economy.
29Forward guidance is issuing explicit statements by central banks about the outlook for future policy or immediate
policy actions that they are undertaking.
30Both studies were written in the same time period, but independently.
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The main findings are as follows: First, discretionary policy requires central banks to keep in-
terest rates at the ZLB for longer in a cost channel economy compared to a no-cost channel economy.
Second under commitment policy, the simulation exercise shows that the central bank is able to ter-
minate the zero interest rate regime earlier in cost channel economies than otherwise. Third, the cost
channel generates substantially high welfare losses, especially under discretionary policy.
The rest of the study is structured as follows: In Section 4.2, I review the relevant literature on
optimal monetary policy at the ZLB and optimal monetary policy with the cost channel. Section 4.3
describes the model, steady states and optimal dynamic paths. Model simulations and results are
given in Section 4.4, while Section 4.5 concludes the study.
4.2 Literature Review
In this section, I review the relevant literature under two main sections. First, the optimal monetary
policy literature at the ZLB is reviewed. Second, the optimal monetary policy literature in a cost
channel economy is reviewed. The main focus in the literature review is on New Keynesian models
as they are most relevant to the present study.
Optimal Monetary Policy at the ZLB
The evolution of the New Keynesian framework, where management of private sector expectations
is incorporated explicitly into economic modeling, has improved the analysis of optimal monetary
policy at the ZLB. The importance of explicit consideration of non-linearities in analysing the beha-
viour of the New Keynesian model at the ZLB has been shown by many scholars (for example, see
Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2015).
There are not many policy options available to perform at the ZLB within the traditional interest
rate instrument. One of them, and the most accepted policy option, is the commitment to a future
policy. Paul Krugman puts it as follows: “...monetary policy will in fact be effective if the central
bank can credibly promise to be irresponsible, to seek a higher future price level” (Krugman, 1998,
p.139). He argues that private agents expect that monetary expansions carried out at the ZLB would
be tightened when the economy has recovered. Such expectations may not stimulate the economy in
the recession. As a solution, Krugman suggests that the central bank should promise to have higher
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future inflation for a longer time.
Following Krugman’s work many suggested in more complex dynamic models that the credible
commitment to a policy plan, which is facilitated by forward guidance is one way of getting out
of the slump. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) studied optimal commitment policy with the ZLB
constraint in an inter-temporal model. In their set-up, the natural interest rate is allowed to take two
different values. Accordingly, the natural rate assumed to be negative at the beginning due to an
external demand shock. Then it moves to its deterministic steady state value in several periods with
a known probability. Eggertsson and Woodford recommended a form of history dependent price-
level targeting rule that can be successfully exercised in a liquidity-trapped recession, if the central
bank is credible. JTW considered a similar set-up to that of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) with
perfect foresight; however, they considered an exogenous AR(1) process to the natural rate of interest.
Both Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and JTW found that at the ZLB, by committing to continue
zero nominal interest rates for longer, the central bank can stimulate the economy by generating
higher inflationary expectations. Extending this work, recently, Hasui et al. (2016) considered optimal
commitment policy in an economy with inflation persistence. They argued that inflation persistence
changes the central bank’s objective from achieving the target inflation rate to inflation smoothing.
Therefore, agents expect an accommodative monetary policy which, in turn, increases inflationary
expectations. This produces an acceleration in inflation and allows the central bank to terminate the
ZLB policy earlier than in an economy without inflation persistence.
By introducing an explicit occasionally binding ZLB constraint, Nakov (2008) and Adam and
Billi (2006, 2007) extended the work of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and JTW. They found that
uncertainty introduced by the occasionally binding ZLB constraint affects the optimal conduct of
monetary policy. For example, they found that under discretionary policy, inflation falls short of its
target for any value of natural interest rate. That is, average value of inflation rate is below the target,
implying the deflation bias.
The above line of research assumes that the central bank is fully credible, such that private agents
believe commitments. Bodenstein et al. (2012) relaxed the assumption of the fully credible central
bank. In a New Keynesian set-up, he found that at the ZLB, such a central bank faces a severe
time-inconsistency problem.
All the studies specified above are based on the central bank optimising the social welfare. There
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is another line of research which studies the performance of simple monetary policy rules at the
ZLB.31 Here, the monetary authority commits to a particular type of rule such as the Taylor rule
(Taylor, 1993). Studies such as those by Fuhrer and Madigan (1997), Eggerston and Woodford (2003),
Wolman (2005), Coenen et al. (2004) and Nakov (2008) examine this problem. These studies, in
general, show that if the target inflation rate is closer to zero, simple policy rules such as the Taylor
rule, can generate significant welfare losses. However, Eggerston and Woodford (2003) and Wolman
(2005) showed that policy rules formulated in terms of a price level target can reduce welfare losses
considerably. In contrast, recently, Hasui et al. (2016) showed that the performance of a price-level
target in an economy with inflation persistence is substantially low.
Optimal Monetary Policy with the Cost Channel
Ravenna and Walsh (2006) were the first to show that the existence of the cost channel has important
implications to the optimal conduct of monetary policy. They showed that the output gap stabilisation
actions – in terms of nominal interest rates – lead to inflation fluctuations in cost channel economies.
Following Ravenna and Walsh (2006), others analysed optimal monetary policy with the cost chan-
nel from different perspectives and found that the cost channel is important when analysing optimal
monetary policy.
The study by Chattopadhyay and Ghosh (2016), written independent of this chapter, considers
optimal monetary policy in a cost channel economy. They report similar results to those from this
chapter under both optimal discretionary and optimal commitment policies using a New Keynesian
model at the ZLB. In addition to the two optimal policies, they consider a policy called ‘T-only’ policy.
Under T-only policy, the central bank chooses and announces the optimal exit time of zero interest
rates regime and promises to exercise discretionary policy following the exit. Chattopadhyay and
Ghosh show that this policy closely replicates commitment policy under both presence and absence
of the cost channel.
Fiore and Tristani (2013) studied optimal monetary policy in a model of the credit channel with the
cost channel of monetary policy. They showed that welfare is directly affected not only by variances
of the inflation rate and the output gap as in the standard case where there is no financial frictions, but
also by variances of interest rates and credit spreads. Credit spreads affect optimal monetary policy
through the cost channel. Higher credit spreads make borrowings costly for firms by increasing the
31Chapter 5 discusses monetary policy rules in the presence of the ZLB in detail.
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marginal cost of production. Overall, the authors have concluded that monetary authorities ought to
pay attention to financial market frictions.
Tillmann (2009a) studied optimal monetary policy with an uncertain cost channel. He concluded
that the central bank’s interest rate response to inflation is negatively correlated with the level of uncer-
tainty about the cost channel. He incorporated uncertainty of the cost channel into the model because
the effectiveness of the cost channel varies significantly over time and across countries. Therefore,
the monetary authority may not be certain about the effectiveness of the true role of the cost channel
at a given time.
Surico (2008), using a New Keynesian model with a cost channel, showed that a central bank that
assigns a positive weight to the output gap in the reaction function makes the economy more prone to
multiple equilibria compared to a no-cost channel economy. His results are robust to forward-looking,
current and backward-looking policy rules. Surico further suggested that, when the cost channel is
empirically important, trying to limit cyclical swings in real activity may result in undesired volatility
of inflation and output.
The next section presents the model, derives steady states and analyses the optimal dynamic path
following a negative shock to the economy.
4.3 The Model
I consider a New Keynesian forward looking inter-temporal model to study optimal monetary policy
in a cost channel economy at the ZLB. This model is most suitable for the present analysis as it
incorporates private sector expectations explicitly into the model. The model is based on the work
of JTW and Ravenna and Walsh (2006). I extend these authors’ models to incorporate both the cost
channel and the ZLB. The following exposition is mainly based on the work of Ravenna and Walsh
(2006). The present model has been simplified by ignoring the government and taste shocks of their
model. Following Ravenna and Walsh, I assume the cost of labour must be financed at the beginning
of the period. However, their assumption that the full labour cost has to be financed externally at the
beginning of the year, has been relaxed.
The model economy consists of three main sectors, namely, households, production and monetary
authority. Financial intermediaries are also part of the economy, where firms borrow money to finance
their wage bill intra-period. These players interact with each other in assets, goods and labour markets.
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4.3.1 Households
There is a large number of identical infinitely-lived households in the economy. The preferences of a
representative household are defined over a composite good Ct and time devoted to employment Nt.
Households maximise the expected present discounted value of utility:
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
[
C1−σt+i
1− σ − χ
N1+ηt+i
1 + η
]
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a subjective rate of discount, σ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and
η > 0 is elasticity of labour supply. Ct is defined as follows:
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
c
(θ−1)/θ
jt dj
]θ/(θ−1)
,
where cjt is the consumption of the good produced by firm j and θ(> 1) is the elasticity of sub-
stitution between varieties. The price elasticity of demand for individual goods is determined by θ.
As θ increases, different goods become closer substitutes. According to this specification, consumer
demand and the aggregate price index are given by cjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−θ
Ct and Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−θjt dj
]1/(1−θ)
,
respectively. The price of the final good of firm j at time t is Pjt.
Households receive their labour income at the beginning of the period at the nominal wage rate
of Wt. They enter the period t with cash holdings of Mt and make deposits Dt at the financial inter-
mediary. Accordingly, households’ consumption expenditures are restricted by the following cash-in-
advance constraint:
PtCt ≤Mt +WtNt −Dt,
and budget constraint:
Mt+1 +Dt + PtCt ≤Mt +WtNt +RtDt + Πt,
where Πt is the profit income received from owning financial intermediaries and Rt is the gross
nominal interest rate. It is also assumed that households are subject to a solvency constraint that
prevents them from engaging in Ponzi-type schemes.
By maximising the household utility subject to budget constraint, the following first order condi-
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tions (FOCs) are obtained:
C−σt = βEt
(
RtPt
Pt+1
)
C−σt+1, (4.1)
χNηt
C−σt
=
Wt
Pt
, (4.2)
PtCt = Mt +WtNt +Dt. (4.3)
The next section describes the production sector of the economy.
4.3.2 Production Sector
Firms in this model use no capital in the production process. They have to pay wages at the beginning
of the period, before realising sales proceeds. The production technology is given by yjt = AtNjt,
where yjt is total demand for good j in period t, Njt is employment by firm j in period t, and At
is an exogenous aggregate productivity factor. The staggered price setting of Calvo (1983) is used,
assuming each firm resets its price optimally in any given period only with probability 1 − ω. Firms
set their prices independently of other firms and of the time elapsed since the last adjustment. As
shown by Gali (2002) and others, this standard production sector specification leads to the following
inflation adjustment equation, mostly known as the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC):
pit = βEtpit+1 + κψˆt, (4.4)
where pit is the rate of inflation between time t−1 and t, ψˆt is the percentage deviation of real marginal
cost around its steady state32 (which is the same for all firms) and the slope parameter of the NKPC
is given by: κ = (1−ω)(1−ωβ)
ω
.33
The cost channel model deviates from the standard New Keynesian model in the specification of
the marginal cost. The marginal cost is different in the cost channel model compared to the standard
model due to the borrowing for the wage bill. What follows is the derivation of the corresponding
real marginal cost with regard to the cost channel model.
Assume a firm takes out a loan in the intra-period worth JWtNt from financial intermediaries to
cover part of its nominal wages of WtNt. Accordingly, J ∈ [0, 1] denotes the portion of the wage bill
32Throughout this thesis, a hat sign (ˆ) denotes the percentage deviation of the concerned variable around its steady
state.
33See Walsh (2010, pp.379-381) for the derivation of the standard NKPC.
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covered by firms using external loans at time t. If J = 1, firms borrow the full wage bill externally. If
J = 0, that means firms do not take out loans externally to cover the wage bill.
Accordingly, the real marginal cost is given by:
ψt =
(
Wt
Pt
)(
Nt
Yt
)
[1 + J(Rt − 1)] . (4.5)
The log linearised real marginal cost (see Appendix B.1 for derivation) is:
ψˆ = (σ + η)xt + JRˆ, (4.6)
where xt is the output gap given by (Yˆt − Yˆ ft ). Yˆt is the percentage deviation of output around its
steady state and Yˆ ft is the percentage deviation of flexible price output around its steady state at time
t.34 The percentage point deviation of nominal interest rate around zero inflation steady state value of
R is given by Rˆt.
Accordingly, the NKPC adjusted for the cost channel is derived using Equations (4.4) and (4.6)
as follows:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κ(σ + η)xt + κJRˆt. (4.7)
It is clear from Equation (4.7), that when J = 1, the NKPC boils down to Ravenna and Walsh
(2006) and when J = 0, it turns to the standard NKPC. Iterating this Equation forward yields the
following:
pit = κ
∞∑
k=0
βkEt
[
(σ + η)xt+k + JRˆt+k
]
.
This equation shows that current inflation depends on both the paths of the output gap and the
paths of the nominal interest rate. The latter influences current inflation directly due to the inclusion
of the cost channel in the model.
Log linearising the Euler equation given by (4.1) yields the well-known dynamic IS equation:
xt = Etxt+1 − σ−1
(
Rˆt − Etpit+1
)
+ ut,
where ut is an exogenous demand disturbance term.
34Equilibrium flexible price output is discussed in detail below.
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Since I compare the results with JTW, to be compatible with their model, I introduce natural rate
of interest (rnt ) as defined by JTW.
35 Accordingly, the dynamic IS equation becomes this:
xt = Etxt+1 − σ−1
[
Rˆt − Etpit+1 − rˆnt
]
, (4.8)
where rˆnt is the percentage point deviation of the net natural interest rate around its zero inflation
steady state value of rn. At the zero inflation steady state, the following result holds:36
R = 1 + rn =
1
β
.
Aggregate Resource Constraint
The economy I consider in this model is a simple economy. It abstracts from aggregate demand
components such as investments, government purchases or net exports. Accordingly, the aggregate
resource constraint of the economy is given by:
Yt = Ct,
where Yt is the aggregate production.
The model developed above is characterised by three distortions. The first of them is the presence
of market power in the goods market due to the monopolistic competition of firms. The second is
due to price rigidity. These two distortions are basic in the standard New Keynesian model. The third
distortion is specific to this study, and it arises due to the cost channel.
Flexible Price Equilibrium
In this section, I relax the price rigidity assumption and examine the equilibrium output under
flexible prices.
Suppose that all firms adjust prices optimally in each period, i.e. prices are fully flexible. When
prices are fully flexible, all firms charge the same price. Each firm sets its price equal to a markup, δ(=
35JTW defines the natural interest rate as follows: rnt = σEt[(y
p
t+1 − ypt ) − (gt+1 − gt) + ( 1β − 1), where ypt is the
potential output and gt is a disturbance that fluctuates independently of changes in the real interest rate.
36At the zero inflation steady state, I assume the potential growth in the economy to be zero and that there will be no
disturbances to the natural rate of interest. Accordingly, the natural interest rate at zero inflation steady state is equal to
1
β − 1. From the Euler equation given by Equation (4.1), it is easy to show that the zero inflation steady state value of the
net nominal interest rate is also equal to 1β − 1.
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θ
θ−1 > 1) over its nominal marginal cost, which is constant over time. Hence, it follows that the real
marginal cost will also be constant and equal to the inverse of the optimal markup chosen by firms.37
Let superscript f denote the flexible price equilibrium values of relevant variables. Accordingly:
[
1 + J(Rf − 1)] [Wt
Pt
]f
At
=
1
δ
.
Hence:
[
Wt
Pt
]f
=
At
δ
[
1 + J(Rft − 1)
] . (4.9)
From Equation (4.2), it follows:
[
Wt
Pt
]f
=
χNηt
C−σt
. (4.10)
Combining Equation (4.9) and (4.10) together with the production function and the resource con-
straint yields the following:
At
δ
[
1 + J(Rft − 1)
] = χ
[
Y ft
At
]η
[
Y ft
]−σ .
Hence:
Y ft =
 A(1+η)t
χδ
[
1 + J(Rft − 1)
]
 1σ+η .
This shows that the equilibrium flexible price output is distorted by monetary policy, as the nom-
inal interest rate is an argument in the equation. With regard to the distortions by monetary policy,
for example, an increase in nominal interest rate decreases labour demand, which in turn reduces the
equilibrium level of flexible price output. This distortion is directly due to the inclusion of the cost
channel in the model.
The steady state value of the flexible price output is given as follows:
Y f =
[
1
χδ [1 + J(Rf − 1)]
] 1
σ+η
,
37See Walsh (2010, pp.334-335) for a detailed description of the flexible price mechanism.
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where Rf is the steady state value of the flexible price nominal interest rate.
The steady state value of the flexible price output is also distorted by monetary policy and mono-
polistic competition. If J = 0, then by construction, the cost channel is eliminated and the distortion
is also eliminated. Further, if the nominal interest rate is zero (or Rf = 1), the distortion brought in
by the cost channel is eliminated. Distortion due to monopolistic competition can be eliminated by
setting δ = 1.
Next, I specify the objective of the monetary authority and its problem.
4.3.3 Monetary Authority
The monetary authority has one monetary instrument, which is the short-term nominal interest rate.
It attempts to minimise the loss function:
L0 =
1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
pi2t + λx
2
t
}
, (4.11)
where λ is a positive parameter representing the weight assigned to output stability. This loss function
has been derived using second-order Taylor expansion of the utility of the representative household.
Woodford (2003) derived this for a standard New Keynesian model, while Ravenna and Walsh (2006)
derived this loss function for a New Keynesian model with cost channel, similar to the present model.
4.3.4 Optimisation Problem
The central bank minimises Equation (4.11) subject to Equations (4.7),(4.8) and the ZLB constraint.
Accordingly, the problem is as follows:
Min
1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
pi2t + λx
2
t
}
, (4.12)
subject to
xt = Etxt+1 − σ−1
(
Rˆt − Etpit+1 − rˆnt
)
,
pit = βEtpit+1 + κ(σ + η)xt + κJRˆt
and
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Rˆt +R− 1 ≥ 0. (4.13)
This problem cannot be solved by applying standard solution methods for rational expectations
models because of the complications brought in by the non-linear constraint in Equation (4.13). To
make the analysis more tractable, I consider the agents with perfect foresight under both discretion
and commitment policies in the following sections.
In this analysis, following JTW, it has been considered that the economy is in a liquidity trap
following a large negative demand shock to the natural interest rate. The natural rate of interest
follows an AR(1) process following the shock and converges to steady state value in and after period
one. The AR(1) process is as follows:
rnt = ρ
t0 + r
n for t = 0, 1, 2, 3..., (4.14)
where 0 is the large negative shock that occurs in the time t = 0, and ρ is the persistence of the shock
(0 < ρ < 1).
The optimisation problem under each commitment and discretionary policies is considered in the
following sections.
4.3.4.1 Optimisation under Discretion Under discretion, the central bank treats the problem as a
sequential optimisation problem. Accordingly, the central bank makes whatever decision is optimal in
each period without committing to future actions. The central bank chooses (xt, pit) in order to min-
imise the objective function given by Equation (4.12) subject to the adjusted NKPC, the dynamic IS
curve and the ZLB constraint. The Lagrangian method is used to solve this constrained optimisation
problem. Accordingly, the Lagrangian is as follows:
L = βt{1
2
(pi2t + λx
2
t ) + µt
[
xt − xt+1 + σ−1
(
Rˆt − pit+1 − rˆnt
)]
+
δt
[
pit − βpit+1 − κ(σ + η)xt − κJRˆt
]
+ νt(Rˆt +R− 1)}, (4.15)
where µt, δt and νt are Lagrangian multipliers.
Under discretion, the central bank optimises in each period. Accordingly, the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions of the problem are the following:
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pit + δt = 0,
λxt + µt − κ(σ + η)δt = 0,
µtσ
−1 − κJδt + νt = 0,
xt − xt+1 + σ−1
(
Rˆt − pit+1 − rˆnt
)
= 0,
pit − βpit+1 − κ(σ + η)xt − κJRˆt = 0,
νt(Rˆt +R− 1) = 0,
νt ≤ 0,
Rˆt +R− 1 ≥ 0.
Steady State under Discretion
At steady state, define xt = x, pit = pi, rnt = r
n, δt = δ, µt = µ, νt = ν, Rˆt = Rˆ and rˆnt = 0.
Also define Rss as the value of the gross nominal interest rate relevant to the particular steady state.38
Accordingly, the KKT conditions become the following:
pi + δ = 0,
λx+ µ− κ(σ + η)δ = 0,
σ−1µ− κJδ + ν = 0,
pi = Rˆ
(1− β)pi − κ(σ + η)x− κJRˆ = 0.
Potentially there can be two steady states in the system, an interior solution and a corner solution.
First, I will consider the interior solution. In this case, the nominal interest rate is strictly positive,
38According to the steady state definition of variables, Rss = Rˆ+R.
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i.e. Rss > 1. According to the KKT conditions, ν = 0. Substituting these into the above steady state
conditions and solving the linear system of equations yields:
pi = 0, x = 0, Rss = 1 + r
n = R, µ = 0, δ = 0 and ν = 0.
In this steady state, inflation and the output gap are zero. This steady state minimises the loss of
the central bank’s objective function.
Now turn to the corner solution. Here, the nominal interest rate has hit the ZLB, i.e. Rss = 1.
Accordingly, Rˆ = 1− R. The solution for ν in the linear system of equations given above is (results
for other variables are given in the Appendix B.2):
ν = − [λ(1− β) + κ(Jλ− κ(η + σ)(η + σ(1− J))] r
n
κσ(η + σ)
.
As required by the KKT conditions, ν is strictly negative at the corner solution for the following
values of J :
J <
λ(1− β) + κ2(η + σ)2
κ(λ+ κσ(η + σ)
.
Therefore, there exists a second steady state at the ZLB when J is sufficiently small. JTW show
that there is a second steady state under discretion for a no-cost channel economy, i.e. when J = 0.
For the baseline parametrisation values set at the calibration section below, the maximum value of J
to have a second steady state is 0.9. This steady state does not minimise the central bank loss function
since both inflation and the output gap have been deviated from zero.
The Friedman rule (Friedman, 1969) of zero nominal interest rate is not optimal in this model.
One reason for this different conclusion is the absence of any explicit role for money in the household
utility approximation of equation, as shown by Walsh (2010, p.355). Another reason is, as mentioned
by JTW, the central bank loss functions defined in these types of optimisation studies do not include
the existence of shoe-leather cost. Friedman argues that distortions due to shoe-leather costs are
proportional to nominal interest rates, therefore, these distortions can be eliminated by setting the
nominal interest rate to zero.
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4.3.4.2 Optimisation under Commitment Under commitment, the central bank optimises the
system and commits to a current and future policy plan. I assume full credibility of the central bank.
Accordingly, the central bank is assumed to choose a state contingent sequence {xt,pit}∞t=0 which
minimises its objective function given by Equation (4.11) subject to the adjusted NKPC, the dynamic
IS curve and the ZLB constraint. Accordingly, the KKT conditions are as follows:
pit − (βσ)−1µt−1 + δt − δt−1 = 0,
λxt + µt − β−1µt−1 − κ(σ + η)δt = 0,
σ−1µt − κJδt + νt = 0,
xt − xt+1 + σ−1
(
Rˆt − pit+1 − rˆnt
)
= 0,
pit − βpit+1 − κ(σ + η)xt − κJRˆt = 0,
νt(Rˆt +R− 1) = 0,
νt ≤ 0,
Rˆt +R− 1 ≥ 0.
Since lagged values of the Lagrange multipliers are appearing in the KKT conditions, it is clear that
the KKT conditions are history dependent. Accordingly, inflation, output and the interest rate depend
on the previous values of the endogenous variables. If the central bank deviates from its policy plan
(a credibility loss), the outcome is different.
Steady State under Commitment
Consider the steady state variables defined under discretionary policy. In the steady state under
commitment, the KKT conditions derived above become these:
pi − (βσ)−1µ = 0,
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λx+ (1− β−1)µ− κ(σ + η)δ = 0,
σ−1µ− κJδ + ν = 0,
pi = Rˆ,
(1− β)pi − κ(σ + η)x− κJRˆ = 0.
It can be shown that the interior solution (i.e. Rss > 1) is exactly the same as in the discretionary
case as follows:
pi = 0, x = 0, Rss = 1 + r
n = R, µ = 0, δ = 0 and ν = 0.
This shows that under each policy, the interior solution converges to the same steady state with
zero inflation and the output gap minimising the central bank loss function.
Now turn to the corner solution under commitment. The solution for ν is as follows:
ν =
[J(1 + κ)λ+ κσ(η + σ) + β (Jλ+ κ(η + σ)(η + σ(1− J))] rn
κ(η + σ)2
.
The sign of ν, which is the Lagrangian multiplier of the ZLB constraint is strictly positive. This
contradicts the KKT conditions. Therefore, under commitment there does not exist a second steady
state at the ZLB.
4.3.5 Optimal Path under Discretion
In this section, I consider the optimal path of variables under discretion. Consider that a large negative
shock occurred to the natural interest rate, which converges to its steady state level over time. Assume
the ZLB is binding until time T d (i.e. t = 0, 1, ...T d) and not binding thereafter (i.e. t ≥ T d + 1).
Consider the dynamic path where t ≥ T d + 1. Here, νt = 0. Accordingly, the KKT conditions
under discretion can be stated as follows:
pit + δt = 0, (4.16)
57
4.3 The Model
λxt + µt − κ(σ + η)δt = 0, (4.17)
µtσ
−1 − κJδt = 0, (4.18)
xt − xt+1 + σ−1
(
Rˆt − pit+1 − rˆnt
)
= 0, (4.19)
pit − βpit+1 − κ(σ + η)xt − κJRˆt = 0. (4.20)
From Equations (4.16)–(4.18):
λxt + κ[σ(1− J) + η]pit = 0. (4.21)
Combining this result with Equations (4.19) and (4.20) yields:
pit+1 = τpit − ζrˆnt , (4.22)
where τ = Jκσa+λ−κ(σ+η)a
Jκσa+Jλκ+λβ
, ζ = Jλκ
Jκσa+Jλκ+λβ
and a = −κ[σ(1− J) + η].
When J = 0, i.e. when firms do not borrow externally to finance the wage bill, Equation (4.22)
is identical to JTW, which is given by pit+1 = β−1
(
1 + κ
2(σ+η)2
λ
)
pit. Since τ is always greater than
unity, as shown by JTW, this difference equation has a bounded solution which is given by pit = 0.
However, when J > 0, τ is not necessarily greater than unity. The value depends on the paramet-
risation. To have an idea about the value of τ , I plot the value of the coefficient with different values
of J given in Figure 4.1.39 The figure shows that the value of τ is greater than unity for smaller values
of J (when J < 0.59), while it is less than unity for higher values of J .
39The parameters are set to baseline values as defined in Section 4.4.2.
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Figure 4.1: J Vs τ under Baseline Parametrisation
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
J
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
Ta
u
The fact that τ becomes less than unity for higher values of J reveals an important difference
between cost channel and no-cost channel economies. First, for larger values of J , Equation (4.22)
has a stationary solution. This means piT d+1 does not necessarily take the value zero as shown in the
case J = 0. Further, according to Equation (4.21), xT d+1 does not take the value zero. Accordingly,
when J > 0, the central bank may not necessarily increase interest rates at time T d+1. Therefore,
when J is larger, the central bank does not necessarily increase interest rates one-to-one with the
exogenous natural rate of the interest rate. Nakov (2008) found a similar result under discretionary
policy when he considered that the natural interest rate follows a stochastic AR(1) process; however,
he did not consider a cost channel economy.
Further, the fact that |τ | < 1 means that there can be multiple equilibria under discretionary policy.
This leads to the equilibrium policy path selection. In the following simulation exercise, I consider the
policy in which the economy returns to the zero inflation steady state on or before the 100th quarter.
4.3.6 Welfare Calculation
To rank between different type of policies and between cost channel and no-cost channel economies,
in the simulation section, I compare the percent loss of consumption (consumption equivalent welfare
loss).
The method of calculation welfare loss is based on Adam and Billi (2007). Adam and Billi (2007,
p.748) show that the utility equivalent percentage loss of consumption in the steady state is given by:
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p = 100 ∗ 1
σ
(
−1 +
√
1 +
2(1− β)L′
1/σ
)
,
where L′ = 1
2
ωθ(1+ζθ)
(1−ω)(1−ωβ)
∑∞
i=0 β
i(pi2t+i + λx
2
t+i) and ζ is elasticity of a firm’s real marginal cost.
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4.4 Simulations and Results
4.4.1 Introduction
I simulate the model and present results in this section.41 In these simulations, I consider three values
for J . They are two extreme values J = 0 and J = 1, and the more empirically relevant value of
J = 0.6.42
4.4.2 Baseline Calibration
I calibrate the model with the baseline specification given in Table 4.1. The parameter values are
within the standard New Keynesian parameter values and are carried over from Ravenna and Walsh
(2006) and JTW.
Table 4.1: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Description Baseline Value
β Discount rate in the utility function 11.01 = 0.99
σ Coefficient of relative risk aversion 1
η Elasticity of labour supply in the utility function 0.5
κ Slope parameter of the NKPC 0.086
ω Share of firms that cannot adjust prices optimally 0.75
λ Weight on output in the loss function 0.25
ρ Natural interest rate shock persistence parameter 0.7
rn Steady state value of the natural rate of interest (per annum) 1β − 1 = 4%
J Share of working capital to be financed externally [0, 1]
Yet, the selection of two parameter values is worth noting here. First, the slope parameter (κ) of
the NKPC is 0.086. This value has been calculated using the formula derived from micro-foundations,
as stated in Section 4.3.2, and the baseline calibration of the structural parameters given in Table 4.1.
40In addition to the baseline parametrisation given in Table 4.1, following Adam and Billi (2007), I set θ = 7.66 and
ζ = 0.47 for welfare calculations.
41I used the software Matlab (version R2016a) to facilitate the simulations.
42As mentioned before, Christiano et al. (2015) estimated that firms borrowed around 56.2% of their working capital
externally in the post-war USA economy. Accordingly, I consider the more empirically relevant value of J = 0.6.
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However, empirical evidence shows the slope of the NKPC is smaller than this value. This issue is
discussed more under Section 4.4.7.1. In that section, the robustness of results under an alternative
calibration with a lower value for κ is analysed. Second, the steady state value of the natural rate of
interest is set at 1β − 1 = 4%, per annum. This value has been calculated, as mentioned before, by
assuming zero growth rate in the potential output at zero inflation steady state.
Unless stated otherwise, parameter values are based on a time period equal to three months (one
quarter).
4.4.3 Path of Natural Interest Rate
The dynamics of the natural interest rate depends on two specifications. First is the exogenous path
of the natural interest rate following the shock. This is specified in Section 4.3.4, which is an AR(1)
process. The second is the specification of the size of the shock. In the baseline simulation, I consider
the initial shock to the economy of size 0 = −0.05, which is equivalent to around a 19% drop in the
annualised natural interest rate.
The dynamic path of the exogenous natural interest rate due to the large negative demand shock
is depicted in Figure 4.2.43 The figure shows that the natural interest rate drops to −15% and returns
to a positive level by the fourth quarter following the shock.
43Annualised values have been reported in the figure.
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Figure 4.2: Path of the Natural Interest Rate
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4.4.4 Dynamic Path under Discretion
Dynamic paths of variables due to the negative demand shock under discretion are considered in this
section. The paths of the following macroeconomic variables are considered: short-term interest rates,
inflation and the output gap. They are depicted in Figure 4.3. The solid lines depict the dynamics of
the case when the cost channel of monetary policy is active (i.e. J = 1). The dashed lines depict the
case in which such channel is not active (i.e. J = 0) while the dotted lines depicts the case J = 0.6.
The case J = 0 is identical to that of JTW.
The top plot of Figure 4.3 depicts the paths of nominal interest rates. It shows, following the
negative demand shock, the central bank reduces nominal interest rates to the zero level in both
economies to stimulate the economy. The plot in the middle of the panel shows paths of inflation.
The inflation plot shows, following the shock, both economies get into a deflationary environment.
The deflation is severe in both economies, as the central bank could not reduce nominal interest rates
below zero to further stimulate the economy. In cost channel economies, deflation is extremely severe
compared to no-cost channel economies. The reason for that is, when the cost channel is active, a
sudden drop in nominal interest rates directly affects the cost of production negatively. Consequently,
it amplifies deflation.
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The deflationary environment observed during the recession following the shock increases real
interest rates. This dampens the output gap, as shown in the bottom plot in the panel. The output
gap is higher in cost channel economies, as the real interest rate is high in cost channel economies
compared to no-cost channel economies during the recession. Since a recession is deeper in cost
channel economies, the central bank has to keep short-term nominal interest rates at the zero level
longer to minimise losses. The top plot in the panel shows that the central bank exits the zero interest
rates regime in the fifth quarter in a cost channel economy compared to the fourth quarter in a no-
cost channel economy. This is the main policy difference between cost channel and no-cost channel
economies under discretion.
63
4.4 Simulations and Results
Figure 4.3: Paths of Variables under Discretionary Policy
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Table 4.2 provides macroeconomic performances under discretion for different values of J . The
table shows that when the cost channel is stronger in an economy, the variations of variables under
considerations are higher.
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Table 4.2: Macroeconomic Performances under Discretion for Different Values of J
4.4.5 Dynamic Path under Commitment
Now I turn to the commitment policy. The reaction of the model economy due to the large negative
shock under commitment is depicted in Figure 4.4. The main result is opposite to the discretionary
regime. As shown in the top plot of the panel, under commitment, the central bank in a cost channel
economy exits the zero nominal interest rate regime earlier than in a no-cost channel economy. The
reason for that is, in a cost channel economy, agents expect higher inflation once the central bank
starts exiting zero interest rates. Because agents expect more inflation in a cost channel economy, the
central bank promises to terminate the zero interest rate policy early. This fact is confirmed in the
inflation plot under commitment. When the central bank commences increasing short-term interest
rates, the cost channel economy is experiencing a higher inflationary regime. Accordingly, the top
plot in the panel shows that the central bank exits the zero interest rates regime in the fifth quarter in
a full cost channel economy compared to the sixth quarter in a no-cost channel economy.
Under commitment, both in cost channel and no-cost channel economies, the monetary authority
attempts to stabilise the output gap and inflation in the short-term. However, under discretion, the
monetary authority attempts to stabilise inflation and the output gap in the medium-term. These facts
are observed in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4. For example, under discretion, initial drop in inflation is
-15% compared to 0% inflation under commitment in cost channel economies.
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Figure 4.4: Paths of Variables under Commitment Policy
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Table 4.3 provides macroeconomic performances under commitment for different values of J .
The table shows that, in contrast to the discretionary policy, under commitment, the variation of the
variables under consideration is lower in cost channel economies.
66
4.4 Simulations and Results
Table 4.3: Macroeconomic Performances under Commitment for Different Values of J
4.4.6 Welfare Loss
Consumption equivalent welfare losses are calculated according to the method specified in Section
4.3.6. Figure 4.5 depicts welfare losses of optimal monetary policy at the ZLB under both discretion
and commitment for alternative values of J . The figure shows a well-known result in the optimal
monetary policy literature at the ZLB: that welfare loss under commitment policy is less than under
discretion. The reason for this is, under discretionary policy, the use of expected inflation is unavail-
able. This is because that there is no incentive to exercise promised inflation in the aftermath of the
recession under discretion. The ZLB, therefore, generates significant additional welfare losses under
discretionary policy.
With regard to the cost channel, welfare losses under both discretion and commitment are high
compared to the no-cost channel economy (compare the cases when J = 0 and J = 1 in Figure 4.5).
The negative impact of the cost channel on welfare under discretionary policy is significant compared
to its impact under commitment policy. In cost channel economies, under commitment, the welfare
loss increases by only 13%, compared to the 82% increase under discretion. Demirel (2013), in a
different context, also found that, in a cost channel economy, a switch from commitment to discretion
in monetary policy yields greater welfare losses relative to those in a no-cost channel economy.
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Figure 4.5: Welfare Losses for Different Values of J
4.4.7 Robustness Check and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, first, I consider an alternative calibration to examine the robustness of results. Then I
move to analyse the sensitivity of the result to a range of reasonable parameter values.
4.4.7.1 Alternative Calibration with a Lower Value for the Slope of the NKPC In this section,
I consider an alternative calibration to the baseline calibration with lower values for the slope of the
NKPC. In the standard New Keynesian model, the slope parameter (κ) captures the impact of the real
marginal cost on inflation. In the cost channel model, κ captures both the impact of the real marginal
cost on inflation and the impact of changes in nominal interest rates on inflation. In the cost channel
economy, the impact of the cost channel depends heavily on the value of κ.
In the literature, the value of the slope of the NKPC has been used within a wide range of values.
It has been observed that when one derives κ with reasonable values for structural parameters, it does
not match with its empirical counterpart. In general, the derived value for κ is much higher than the
empirical value. To match the empirical value of the NKPC slope coefficient, scholars often introduce
real rigidities into the model. A reduced-form way to consider the consequences of real rigidities is
to calibrate a lower value for the slope coefficient of the NKPC exogenously.
Table 4.4 shows both calibrated values and empirical values that have been used in the relevant
literature for the slope coefficient of the NKPC. The table shows that the derived value of the slope
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of the NKPC is in the range of [0.129, 0.376], while the empirical findings are lower, in the range
of [0.01, 0.1]. The table also shows that, to match the empirical values, the studies such as those of
Nakov (2008) and Walsh (2010) calibrated the slope coefficient of the NKPC with a smaller value, in
a reduced-form way.
Table 4.4: Slope Coefficient of the NKPC - A Brief Literature Review
In the following analysis, I calibrate lower values for the slope of the NKPC in a reduced-form
way. Following Walsh (2010, p.362), first I set the slope of the NKPC; κ(σ + η) = 0.05. The rest of
the parametrisation is baseline calibration. The dynamics of variables are shown in Figure 4.6. Under
discretion, in the left panel, the figure shows that the exit dates in a cost channel economy and in a
no-cost channel economy are identical. However, the interest rate increase following the zero rate
policy is lower in cost channel economies. Further, drops in inflation during recession, both under
cost channel and no-cost channel economies, are lower compared to those in a higher NKPC slope
coefficient, which is shown in Figure 4.3 .
However, the right panel of Figure 4.6 shows that, under commitment, even a lower value of the
slope coefficient accelerate the optimal exit in cost channel economies.
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Figure 4.6: Paths of Variables - With a Lower Value for Slope of NKPC (Slope= 0.05)
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When the slope of the NKPC is set to a smaller value, such as 0.024 (following Nakov, 2008),
the impact on the dynamics of the variables in cost channel economies is milder. The dynamics of
variables when slope = 0.024 are shown in Appendix B.3.
In this section, I consider a range of values for the slope of the NKPC and analyse the results
for various values of the natural interest rate shock. Table 4.5 shows the results. In this analysis,
I consider the optimal exit time of a zero interest rate regime in quarters under both commitment
and discretionary policies in cost channel and no-cost channel economies. Under commitment, the
table shows, when the shock size is large, even for smaller values of the slope coefficient generate
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differences in optimal exit date between cost channel and no-cost channel economies. However, for
smaller values of the slope coefficient, under discretion, there is no impact on the exit date.
Table 4.5: Sensitivity Analysis - Slope of the NKPC and the Size of the Natural Interest Rate Shock
4.4.7.2 Sensitivity Analysis In order to determine the sensitivity of the results to a range of reas-
onable parameter values, a sensitivity analysis is performed in this section. First, I consider sensitivity
analysis by changing only one parameter from the baseline calibration.
Sensitivity of Results: Change of One Parameter Value at a Time
In this section, I change the value of one parameter in each scenario, leaving other parameter
values at baseline values and examine the results. Table 4.6 shows the results. The results confirm the
above main findings, under both discretion and commitment.
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Table 4.6: Sensitivity Analysis - Change of One Parameter Value at a Time
Sensitivity of Results: Change of Two Parameter Values at a Time
In this section, I change the values of two parameters at a time and examine the results. I begin
with alternative sizes of shocks and their persistence. Table 4.7 presents results. The table reports
optimal exit times for zero interest rate regimes in quarters for each case. As expected, the table
shows that when the shock size is high and persistent, it takes longer to exit the zero interest rate
regime. Further, the result that I found for the baseline parametrisation is valid here too. That is,
under discretionary policy, it takes an equal or longer time to exit a zero interest rates regime in a cost
channel economy compared to in a no-cost channel economy. In contrast, under commitment it takes
a shorter or equal time to exit a zero interest rate regime in a cost channel economy.
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Table 4.7: Sensitivity Analysis - Shock Size and Shock Persistence
Shock Size and its Persistence
 = −0.02 −0.05 −0.1 −0.3
ρ = 0 0.5 0.7 ρ = 0 0.5 0.7 ρ = 0 0.5 0.7 ρ = 0 0.5 0.7
Discretion
J = 0 0 0 1 0 2 4 0 3 6 0 4 9
J = 1 0 1 2 0 2 5 0 3 7 0 5 10
Commitment
J = 0 0 1 2 1 3 6 2 5 8 4 7 11
J = 1 0 1 2 1 3 5 2 4 7 3 6 10
Note: Duration of zero interest rate regime in quarters are shown.
Next, I examine the sensitivity of results to the following variables: a share of firms who cannot
optimise prices in each period and labour supply elasticity under commitment policy. The results
are given in Table 4.8. The table reports optimal exit times for zero interest rate regimes in quarters
for each case. The table shows that when the prices are relatively flexible (when ω takes relatively
smaller values) and also when they are relatively rigid (when ω takes relatively larger values), there
is no difference between a cost channel economy and a no-cost channel economy with regard to the
optimal zero interest rate exit date.
Table 4.8: Sensitivity Analysis - Price Rigidity and Labour Supply Elasticity under Commitment
Price Rigidity
ω = 0.3 ω = 0.75 ω = 0.9
η = 0.01
J = 0 5 6 6
J = 1 5 5 6
η = 0.5
J = 0 5 6 6
J = 1 5 5 6
η = 1
J = 0 5 6 6
J = 1 5 5 6
Note: Duration of zero interest rate regime in
quarters are shown.
I also considered the sensitivity of results with regard to the discount factor, which I have not
reported here. The main qualitative findings of this chapter do not change to various values of β for
both cost and no-cost channel economies.
4.5 Conclusion
In this study, I incorporated the cost channel of monetary policy into an otherwise standard New
Keynesian model and evaluated optimal monetary policy at the ZLB. I considered that the economy
was initially in a recession with a liquidity trap, following a large negative demand shock. The
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solution methodology was different from the standard New Keynesian model as the ZLB brings non-
linearity into the model. I followed the JTW solution methodology in a perfect foresight environment,
which solves the problem considering that the economy is already at the ZLB.
The study revealed some important results in the conduct of optimal monetary policy in a cost
channel economy at the ZLB. First, discretionary policy requires central banks to keep interest rates
at the ZLB for longer in a cost channel economy. This is because, in cost channel economies, the
recession is severe and persistent due to a large negative demand shock compared to that in no-cost
channel economies. Further, cost channel economies introduce policy trade-offs between inflation
and the output gap. This result contradicts the finding by JTW that short-term interest rates follow a
one-to-one exogenous natural rate of interest following a negative demand shock in a no-cost channel
economy. Under the commitment policy with a fully credible monetary authority, the simulation
exercise showed that the central bank is able to terminate the zero interest rate regime earlier in a cost
channel economy than otherwise. This result is in contrast to the results found under discretionary
policy.
It was revealed that the cost channel generates appreciable welfare losses, especially under dis-
cretionary policy. Accordingly, abstracting the cost channel in these type of models can lead to under
estimation of welfare losses.
The analysis carried out in this chapter assumed a perfect foresight rational equilibrium. I con-
sidered the perfect foresight assumption for two main reasons. The first was to have as simple a
model as possible so it was easy to focus on differences between cost channel and no-cost channel
economies. The second was to compare the results of other studies, such as those of JTW, which
have utilised the perfect foresight assumption. Related to that, an interesting future study would be to
incorporate uncertainty into the model and analyse the differences of dynamic paths and steady states
of cost channel and no-cost channel models under optimal monetary policy.
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5 Interest Rate Rules, Forward Guidance Rules and the Zero
Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates in a Cost Channel
Economy
“A rule is nothing more than a systematic decision process that uses information in
a consistent and predictable way”
Allan H. Meltzer (1993)
5.1 Introduction
Rules have generally been used to approximate central bank policies and predict them. It is well
known that normal central banking activities, as well as economic activities, are affected by the ex-
istence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (ZLB).44 This is no different with regard to
monetary policy rules.45 Studies of monetary policy rules with occasionally binding ZLB constraint
have shown that the ZLB not only aggravates recessions, but also affects deterministic steady state
values. However, the impact of the supply-side effects of monetary policy on economic conditions
under monetary policy rules at the ZLB has not been examined thus far. The main aim of the present
study is to begin filling this gap in the literature by analysing interest rate rules at the ZLB when mon-
etary policy has supply-side effects. This is important because the existence of the supply-side effects
of monetary policy involves direct feedback effects on nominal interest rates and inflation through
monetary policy rules, especially, interest rate rules.46 This direct feedback mechanism of supply-
side effects may affect previous results under monetary policy rules with the ZLB constraint. The
supply-side effects of monetary policy is incorporated by considering the cost channel of monetary
policy. This research also proposes an endogenous threshold-based forward guidance (FG) policy
44As mentioned before, in this thesis, I consider the short-term nominal interest rate is constrained by the zero lower
bound. However, on a few occasions, as specified in those sections, I relax that assumption.
45Monetary policy rules, in the context of this thesis, can be defined as follows: The central bank follows a monetary
policy rule to set current nominal interest rates. The rule is directly expressed by economic variables such as the inflation
rate, price level, output gap, lags and leads of those variables and nominal interest rates.
46For example, a negative demand shock contracts output and creates deflationary pressure. The central bank cuts
nominal interest rates as prescribed by the interest rate rule. This expansionary monetary policy reduces the cost of
production and thereby inflation through the cost channel mechanism and this feeds back to a larger interest rate cut in the
next period, and so on.
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rule.47 According to this FG rule, the central bank announces forward guidance well before a reces-
sion and activates the rule endogenously during a recession.
Monetary policy rules have been in discussion since Adam Smith.48 For example, in the 18th
century, in the UK, a rule called the real bills doctrine was proposed for liquidity expansion. Under
this rule, new liquidity could be created only to finance real goods in the course of production and
distribution (Asso et al., 2007). A turning point in the 20th century monetary economics was the
recommendation by Milton Friedman (1960) that the money supply should be increased by a fixed
percentage every time period. This rule is popularly known as Friedman’s k-percent rule.
The intellectual debate of rules versus discretion is nearly as old as monetary policy rules.49 Stan-
ley Fischer (1990) noted that, the pre-1977 arguments for rules lacked any convincing demonstration
to justify that rules might systematically be better than discretion. The turning point in this debate
occurred in 1977 with the seminal paper of Kydland and Prescott (1977): Rules rather than Dis-
cretion: the Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, in which the authors demonstrated that rules produce
time-consistent outcomes if the policy maker’s announcement is credible. On the other hand, discre-
tion is time-inconsistent. Although empirical evidence is inconclusive, much of it is in favour of rules
over discretion.50
Monetary policy rules can broadly be categorised into two as follows: Instrument Rules and Tar-
geting Rules. The debate as to which one is superior, is ongoing. An instrument rule is generally a
simple formula for setting the central bank monetary policy instrument, such as the short-term nom-
inal interest rate. In contrast, a targeting rule is more complex. A targeting rule, in general, specifies
objectives to be achieved by listing the target variables (such as inflation) and corresponding targets
(such as inflation target) and identifies a loss function that should be minimised (see Svensson, 2003,
47In general, forward guidance is considered as the central bank’s public announcement of its near future policy plan.
The literature identifies two major categories of forward guidance, namely, Odyssean and Delphic (see Campbell et al.,
2012). In Odyssean forward guidance, the monetary authority publicly commits to a future action (for an application
see Boneva et al., 2015). In Delphic forward guidance, the monetary authority merely forecasts and announces macroe-
conomic performance and likely monetary policy actions (for an application see Fujiwara and Waki, 2016). Odyssean
forward guidance can further be categorised into two, namely, calendar-based forward guidance and threshold-based
forward guidance. In calendar-based forward guidance, the central bank commits to maintaining zero interest rate policy
for a fixed duration. In threshold-based forward guidance, the monetary authority announces maintaining interest rates at
the ZLB until a pre-announced variable breaches a pre-determined threshold. The present study analyses a variance of
threshold-based forward guidance.
48See Asso et al. (2007).
49See Fischer (1990).
50In a recent analysis, John B. Taylor (2012) argues that the recent monetary policy in the United States can be divided
into two: first, a rule-based era from 1985 to 2003, then an ad hoc era from 2003 to 2012 characterised by discretionary
policy. The stable economic conditions during the first era, and the generally poor economic conditions during the second
era, lead him to conclude that rules are preferable to discretion.
76
5.1 Introduction
p.429). The opponents of instrument rules, such as Svensson (2003), argue that if the central bank
announces an instrument rule, it has to follow the rule mechanically and there is no room for using
judgement. The proponents of instrument rules oppose this argument by pointing out that monetary
policy rules, in general, suggest that rules should be used as guidelines or general policy frameworks,
rather than mechanical mathematical formulae (see Taylor, 2000).
The celebrated Taylor rule is an interest rate instrument rule proposed by the prominent macroe-
conomist John B. Taylor in 1993. The rule successfully describes the Federal Reserve Bank of the
USA (Fed) interest policy during the period of 1987-1992. The Taylor rule is considered as a good
estimation of the Fed policy under normal circumstances, but as with many other rules, it fails during
recessions in the presence of liquidity traps. Under such challenging economic conditions, the Taylor
rule generally prescribes large negative nominal interest rates. Although small negative nominal in-
terest rates have been exercised in a limited number of central banks recently, the consensus is that
large negative interest rates are not feasible.51 In a liquidity trap with the ZLB constraint, a natural ex-
tension of the Taylor rule, often referred to as the truncated Taylor rule (TTR), has been proposed by
scholars. The TTR simply prescribes zero nominal interest rates whenever the Taylor rule prescribes
negative rates.
The ZLB constraint was initially incorporated into perfect foresight models where agents never
expecting liquidity traps in the future (for example, see Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). How-
ever, with the inclusion of the ZLB as an occasionally binding constraint, previous results of perfect
foresight models changed (see Adam and Billi, 2006, 2007 and Nakov, 2008). The main result found
with the inclusion of uncertainty is the deflation bias at the steady state. This steady state was later
named the risky steady state by Coeurdacier et al. (2011) who define the risky steady state as follows:
“The risky steady state is the point where agents choose to stay at a given date if they expect future
risk and if the realization of shocks is zero at this date” (Coeurdacier et al., 2011, p.398). Schol-
ars argue that the deflation bias risky steady state found in this literature can explain lower inflation
–lower than the target inflation rate– observed in many countries including the USA following the
Great Recession. They further argue that, following the Great Recession, attaining inflation targets
has been harder than before. This is because, the recent ZLB event may have led the agents to revise
upward their assessment of the ZLB risk (see Hills et al., 2016).
51Economic agents may not lend under large negative nominal interest rate conditions due to the opportunity cost. They
may prefer to hold cash.
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It has been well documented that the cost channel of monetary policy affects the optimal conduct
of monetary policy in important ways (for example, see Ravenna and Walsh, 2006). Further, as shown
in Chapter 4 of this thesis and in Chattopadhyay and Ghosh (2016), the existence of the cost channel
affects the optimal monetary policy decisions at the ZLB. Specifically, in Chapter 4, I show that an
optimal discretionary policy requires central banks to keep interest rates at the zero level for longer
while an optimal commitment policy requires central banks to terminate zero interest rates earlier in
a cost channel economy compared to a no-cost channel economy.
A natural question that arises at this point is what the behaviour of the main macroeconomic
variables would be when a central bank is assumed to be following a monetary policy rule, such as
the TTR, in a cost channel economy at the ZLB. To the best of my knowledge, this question has not
been examined before. This is important because the cost channel accelerates the drop in inflation
during a negative demand shock, which feeds back directly into nominal interest rates through the
interest rate rule. This mechanism with the cost channel may alter previous results under monetary
policy rules at the ZLB.
Accordingly, the main objective of this study is to perform a quantitative analysis to examine the
conduct of monetary policy under interest rate rules in a cost channel economy at the ZLB. The ZLB
is considered as an occasionally binding constraint.
The other objective of this study is to study an endogenous threshold-based forward guidance
policy rule to examine whether that policy rule is able to improve economic conditions during a
recession as well as at the steady state. This FG rule is largely motivated by the threshold-based
forward guidance carried out by the Fed in December, 2012. In that monetary policy exercise, the
Fed announced that it would not exit a zero interest rates policy regime until the unemployment rate
dropped to 6.5%.52 This announcement was a surprise. However, in the present study, forward guid-
ance is considered as an anticipated policy rule accompanied by the TTR. The novelty of this rule is,
it is anticipated and endogenous. This fact could affect the steady state values of the variables. In the
previous literature, forward guidance has mostly been studied as an exogenous transitory unanticip-
ated shock. By construction, this kind of transitory unanticipated forward guidance does not affect
the steady state.
52The Fed’s December, 2012 monetary policy statement was recorded as follows: “In particular, the Committee also
decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this
exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains
above 6-1/2 percent...” (see Fed, 2012).
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To achieve the above objectives, I consider a reduced-form rational expectations New Keynesian
model with the cost channel. I assume that the ZLB constraint is occasionally binding. The model
is log-linearised; the only non-linearity comes from the monetary policy reaction function. Since
the non-linear model is stochastic in nature and the ZLB binds occasionally, no analytical solution
exists. Therefore, I resort to a numerical method to solve the model. Specifically, I use the numerical
approximation method called the collocation method, which is discussed in Section 5.4.1.
The main results are as follows: The cost channel economy is more likely to fall into a liquidity
trap and remain there longer under the TTR compared to a no-cost channel economy. This fact, and
the amplified asymmetry in expected production costs make the deflation bias large in the risky steady
state in cost channel economies compared to that of no-cost channel economies. The welfare loss is
higher when uncertainty is high and the welfare loss is appreciably higher in cost channel economies
compared to no-cost channel economies. These results suggest that achieving the inflation target
in cost channel economies is more challenging than in no-cost channel economies, if agents expect
future liquidity traps.
The FG rule can avoid the deflation bias in the risky steady state; indeed, under strict forward
guidance, the economy might experience an inflation bias. This happens by managing private sector
expectations. The FG rule reduces the probability of hitting the ZLB compared to that of the TTR.
Furthermore, a recession under the FG rule is less painful and welfare maximising compared to the
TTR policy. The above results under forward guidance hold irrespective of the existence of a cost
channel. The cost channel increases the inflation bias at the risky steady state under the FG rule.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: In Section 5.2, I review the relevant literature
on monetary policy rules at the ZLB and forward guidance. Section 5.3 describes the model, while
Section 5.4 discusses the solution method and parametrisation of the model. The model simulations
and results are given in Section 5.5 while Section 5.6 concludes the study.
5.2 Literature Review
Monetary policy strategies in the presence of the ZLB have been studied extensively in the economics
literature. In general, the literature suggests that a purely forward-looking approach to policy can lead
to bad outcomes in a liquidity-trapped recession following a negative demand shock (for example, see
Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003).
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However, many studies, including the study cited above, assume perfect foresight. Perfect foresight
is a fair benchmark. Yet, in that setting, it is assumed that agents never expect the ZLB to be reached
in the future. Adam and Billi (2006, 2007), Nakov (2008) and Hills et al. (2016), among others,
have considered both optimal monetary policy and monetary policy rules in a stochastic setting with
uncertainty. In the stochastic setting, the ZLB is considered as an occasionally binding constraint.
Surprisingly, when the ZLB is considered as an occasionally binding constraint, not only do the
previous results about the recession change, but importantly, the steady state is different from the
deterministic steady state. This steady state under uncertainty is called the risky steady state. The
main result found in this literature, which incorporates uncertainty by way of occasionally binding
ZLB constraint, is the existence of a deflation bias in the risky steady state (for example, see Adam
and Billi, 2006, 2007 and Nakov, 2008). A deflation bias at the steady state is observed because, the
expected cost of production is distributed asymmetrically in the steady state as agents expect the ZLB
occurrences in the future. When the expected marginal cost is less due to the ZLB, pricing decisions
of firms today are affected, resulting in the deflation bias steady state.
It is well established that when the ZLB is considered, under interest rate rules, there can be
multiple equilibria (for example, see Benhabib et al., 2001b). Generally, studies have shown that
there can be a bad deflationary steady state with the deflationary liquidity-trap and a good steady state
with inflation achieving its target. The bad deflationary steady state and the risky steady state are
different. The risky steady state is generally a deviation from deterministic steady state whereas the
bad deflationary steady state itself is a unique deterministic steady state.
According to Taylor and Williams (2010), research has identified four important implications
of interest rate rules at the ZLB. First, the interest rate rule should be modified to incorporate the
ZLB. This modification is normally termed as the truncated interest rate rule, which introduces an
additional non-linearity to the model. Second, the ZLB can imply multiple steady states, which is
discussed above. Third, the ZLB may have implications for the parametrisation of the monetary
policy reaction function. For example, increasing the response to the output gap helps reduce the
effects of the ZLB. Fourth, the ZLB provides a case for higher target inflation.
Sugo and Teranishi (2005) examined the optimal monetary policy rules at the ZLB. They con-
sidered three interest rate rules in their exercise. These rules consist of variables such as the inflation
rate, the output gap and their lags, including the lag of the nominal interest rate. The rules examined
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by Sugo and Teransihi have been shown to be optimal by Giannoni and Woodford (2002) under no-
ZLB constraint. Sugo and Teranishi showed that optimal rules, which ignore the ZLB constraint, do
not always remain optimal with the ZLB constraint. However, the only exception they found was
the interest rate rule which does not include lagged nominal interest rate. That rule remains optimal
regardless of the ZLB constraint.
The impact of the cost channel under monetary policy rules at the ZLB has not been exclusively
studied. However, the impact of the cost channel on monetary policy rules under normal conditions,
i.e. without the ZLB constraint, has been studied. Llosa and Tuesta (2009), Surico (2008) and Brück-
ner and Schabert (2003) have shown that in existence of the cost channel, Taylor-type instrument rules
may induce indeterminacy. Llosa and Tuesta (2009) have particularly considered two variations of the
Taylor rule, i.e. contemporaneous and forward-looking rules. They have shown that determinacy may
only be attainable if the central bank reacts modestly to both the output gap and inflation expectations
in a cost channel model.
In practice, forward guidance has been instrumental in stimulating the economy at the ZLB, espe-
cially in the Great Recession (see Smith and Becker, 2015). In the monetary policy modeling, forward
guidance is generally incorporated into the models in a few different ways. The first way is with an
optimal commitment policy, in which the general public is informed of the state-contingent policy
plan of the central bank (see Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). However, such a policy is non-trivial
to implement. This is because, it may not be feasible to provide a complete description of all possible
state-contingent future interest rate paths. Although it was possible to write down these policy paths,
yet, it would be difficult to explain it to the general public (see Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003,
p.181). The second way is to incorporate forward guidance as an external news shock to nominal
interest rates (see Laséen and Svensson, 2011). The third way is to incorporate forward guidance as
an exogenous extension to the zero interest rate regime (see Chattopadhyay and Daniel, 2015). The
fourth way is to incorporate forward guidance endogenously by augmenting the monetary policy rule,
such as the Taylor rule (see Reifschneider and Williams, 2000 and Katagiri, 2016).
The fifth way to incorporate forward guidance into models is to assume that the central bank an-
nounces a transitory endogenous rule (see Boneva et al., 2015). In this form of forward guidance,
the central bank announces either threshold-based or calendar-based forward guidance during a li-
quidity trap. This announcement is entirely unanticipated. This kind of forward guidance is more
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closer to the practical forward guidance exercises under Odyssean forward guidance. Boneva et al.
(2015), using their model, have showed that the threshold-based forward guidance is superior to the
purely calendar-based forward guidance. They have considered a New Keynesian model with optimal
monetary policy.
The FG rule proposed in the present study is closer to the fifth category. However, in contrast, the
present FG rule is not unanticipated. The FG rule in this study is informed to agents by the central
bank at time zero; accordingly agents form expectations.
5.3 The Model
The economy is represented by three blocks, as is standard in the New Keynesian literature. They
are: an aggregate demand block represented by the dynamic IS equation (DIS), an aggregate supply
block represented by the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) and the monetary policy block. To
incorporate the cost channel, as utilised in Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis, I assume that a portion of
the cost of the working capital must be financed by firms externally at the beginning of the period.
5.3.1 Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply Blocks
The aggregate demand and the aggregate supply blocks are identical to the description provided in
Chapter 4. Accordingly, the DIS is given by:
xt = Etxt+1 − σ−1
[
Rˆt − Etpit+1 − rˆnt
]
,
and NKPC with the cost channel is given by:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κ(σ + η)xt + κJRˆt,
where xt is the output gap, pit is the rate of inflation between time t − 1 and t. Rˆt and rˆnt are the
percentage point deviation of nominal interest rate and natural interest rate from their corresponding
zero inflation steady state values, respectively. β ∈ (0, 1) is a subjective rate of discount, σ > 0 is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion and η > 0 is the elasticity of labour supply. The slope parameter
of the NKPC: κ = (1−ω)(1−ωβ)
ω
, where ω is share of firms that cannot adjust prices optimally.
The parameter J ∈ [0, 1] in the NKPC represents the cost channel of monetary policy. It denotes
the portion of the wage bill covered by firms using external short-term loans taken out at the beginning
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of time t. These loans are to be settled within the time period t. For example, J = 1 means firms
borrow the full wage bill externally. On the other hand, J = 0 means firms do not take out loans
externally to cover the wage bill.
5.3.2 Monetary Policy Block
Two types of monetary policies are considered in this chapter. One is truncated Taylor-type rules and
the other one is a forward guidance rule.
5.3.2.1 Truncated Taylor-Type Rules In the baseline model, it is assumed that monetary policy is
conducted using a truncated Taylor rule with contemporaneous inflation and contemporaneous output
gap variables (i.e. contemporaneous truncated Taylor rule, for short CTTR). Accordingly, the CTTR
constrained by the ZLB is given by:
Rt = max[1, r
∗ + pi∗ + φpi(pit − pi∗) + φxxt],
whereRt is the gross nominal interest rate, r∗ is the equilibrium real gross interest rate, pi∗ is the target
inflation rate, φpi is the inflation response coefficient and φx is the output gap response coefficient.
In addition to that, to examine the robustness of results, three variations of TTRs are considered as
follows: a) Backward-looking truncated rule (BLTR):Rt = max[1, r∗+pi∗+φpi(pit−1−pi∗)+φxxt−1],
b) Forward-looking truncated rule (FLTR): Rt = max[1, r∗ + pi∗ + φpi(pit+1 − pi∗) + φxxt+1] and, c)
Interest rate smoothing truncated rule (ISTR): Rt = max[1, φiRt−1 + (1−φi)RTaylort ], where RTaylort
is the value of the nominal interest rate prescribed by the TTR and φi is the interest rate smoothing
coefficient.
5.3.2.2 Forward Guidance Rule I consider an endogenous threshold-based (or data-based) FG
rule. Rather than considering an exogenous shock, here I consider a state-contingent rule-based for-
ward guidance which activates endogenously, according to economic conditions. In normal times,
the central bank conducts monetary policy following a TTR. However, the central bank promises to
maintain a fixed policy rate (for example, zero nominal interest rates) until a specific event occurs
whenever the economy moves to a liquidity trap. For example, the central bank may promise to hold
interest rates at the zero level until the unemployment rate breaches a certain threshold following a
recession. This forward guidance announcement is made at time zero. Therefore, it is permanent and
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anticipated by the general public. This is different from the normal forward guidance policy experi-
ments found in the literature. In the literature, in general, the forward guidance policy announcement
is entirely unanticipated and transitory.
Specifically, under the present FG rule, I consider that the central bank credibly announces the
following: that it will keep interest rates at the zero level until the lagged output gap recovers to
a certain level following the liquidity trap. At the exit of the zero interest rate policy, following a
recession, the central bank promises to follow the TTR as before. More formally, the FG rule can be
stated as follows:
Rt = 1 if
[
RTaylort ≤ 1
]
or [Rt−1 = 1 and xt−1 < a] ,
Rt = R
Taylor
t otherwise,
where a < 0 is a value chosen by the central bank. If the central bank chooses a large value for a, that
is considered as strict forward guidance, while if the central bank chooses a small value for a, that is
considered as weak forward guidance.
According to this rule, whenever the TTR prescribes zero interest rates, the central bank moves
to the zero interest rate regime from the non-zero policy rate regime. However, return from the zero
interest rate regime is not exclusively based on the TTR. The central bank agrees to keep the zero
interest regime longer, until the previous period output gap has breached a pre-specified threshold
level.
5.3.3 Shock Process
The economy is prone to be hit by a stochastic shock to the natural interest rate. The natural interest
rate is assumed to follow an exogenous mean reverting process, as specified by Nakov (2008) in the
aftermath of the shock, as follows:
rˆnt = ρrˆ
n
t−1 + t,
where t is i.i.d. N(0, σ2 ), σ
2
 is the variance of the shock and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the persistence parameter.
Due to the stochastic nature of the shock process, the non-negativity constraint of the nominal
interest rate may bind occasionally.
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5.3.4 Welfare Calculation
The welfare calculation is similar to the procedure used in Chapter 4 of this thesis.53 The utility equi-
valent percentage loss of consumption in the steady state is given by, p = 100∗ 1
σ
(
−1 +
√
1 + 2(1−β)L
′
1/σ
)
.
Here, L′ = 1
2
ωθ(1+ζθ)
(1−ω)(1−ωβ)
∑∞
i=0 β
i(pi2t+i + λx
2
t+i), where, λ is the weight assigned to the output gap in
the monetary authority’s objective function,54 ζ is elasticity of a firm’s real marginal cost and θ is the
elasticity of substitution among production varieties.55
The welfare maximising condition for the loss function used in the welfare calculation requires
inflation and the output gap take zero values. Since both inflation and the output gap take non-zero
values at the risky steady state, welfare is not maximised at risky steady states.
5.4 Solution Method and Calibration
This section describes the solution method used in this study and the model calibration.
5.4.1 Solution Method
Since the proposed non-linear rational expectations model is stochastic in nature and the ZLB binds
occasionally, no analytical solution is possible. Therefore, I resort to a numerical method to solve the
model. I use the numerical approximation method called the collocation method. This methodology
has been widely used in past studies including Nakov (2008), Adam and Billi (2006, 2007), Gavin
et al. (2013), Boneva et al. (2015) and Joo (2010) to solve models with occasionally binding ZLB
constraint.
Any numerical method has its own advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of colloca-
tion is, it is a global method, which is appropriate for analysing the proposed stochastic model with an
occasionally binding constraint. Further, the collocation method is flexible, accurate and numerically
efficient compared to the more commonly used linear-quadratic approximation method (see Miranda
and Fackler, 2004, Chapter 9).
53The method of calculation is based on the work by Adam and Billi (2007, p.748).
54The monetary authority’s loss function takes the form: L0 = − 12E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t
{
pi2t + λx
2
t
}
. This loss function has
been derived using a second-order Taylor expansion of the utility of the representative household. Woodford (2003)
derives this for a standard New Keynesian model, while Ravenna and Walsh (2006) derive it for a New Keynesian model
with the cost channel, which is similar to the present model.
55Following Adam and Billi (2007), I set λ = 0.003, θ = 7.66, ζ = 0.47 for the welfare calculation under Section 5.5.
85
5.4 Solution Method and Calibration
There are two main disadvantages of collocation. In the context of the ZLB constraint, it is
known that there can be multiple equilibria. However, the collocation method would solve only for
one of them.56 Second, this methodology may not be able to compute an equilibrium for a certain
region in the parameter space. For example, Richter and Throckmorton (2015), with a fully non-
linear model, report that when the persistence of the shock process increases, the standard deviation
of the innovation should decline to avoid a non-convergence region.57 However, the latter issue is not
exclusively relevant to the collocation method.
The following is a brief description of the collocation method. Readers may refer to Miranda and
Fackler (2004, Chapter 9) or McGrattan (2001) for a general description about the collocation method
or Nakov (2008) for more specific details relevant to the context of this study.
The rational expectation problem at our hand is to solve for the policy plan, xt, when equilibrium
responses are given by the complementary condition:
f [st, xt, Eth(st+1, xt+1), a(st), b(st)] = φt,
with the state transition function: st+1 = g(st, xt, t+1), where h[s, x(s)] is the expectation function
to be approximated58 and t+1 is the exogenous shock.
Note that xt and φt satisfy the following complementary conditions: a(st) ≤ xt ≤ b(st), xjt >
aj(st) => φjt ≤ 0, xjt < bj(st) => φjt ≥ 0, where φjt measures the marginal loss from activity j.
The expectation function is approximated using a linear combination of n basis functions:
h([s, x(s)] ≈
n∑
j=1
cjθj(s),
where θj is a known basis function and cj is basis function coefficient. The coefficient vector c is
updated by solving the following system:
∑n
j=1 cjθj(si) = h(si,xi).
To approximate the normally distributed shock to the natural interest rate, they are discretised
using the K-node Gaussian quadrature scheme.
The endogenous variables relevant to the present study are xt, pit and it. The endogenous state
56For example, as discussed under Literature Review Section, Benhabib et al. (2001b) show that the New Keynesian
models constrained by the ZLB can have two deterministic steady state equilibria. The inflation target is met in one steady
state while the economy experiences deflation in the other. The solution method that I use in this chapter, which has been
used in the papers cited above, however, does not converge to the deflationary steady state.
57I experience the same non-convergence behaviour in the present analysis.
58Response function approximation is also possible, but it may lead to difficulties when facing the kink due to the ZLB
constraint (see Miranda and Fackler, 2004, p.302).
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variables are pit−1,xt−1 and it−1 while rnt is the exogenous state variable.
59
5.4.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated using standard parameter values for the US economy as given in Table 5.1.
Unless otherwise specified, quarterly parameter values are reported in the table.
Table 5.1: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Description Baseline Value
β Discount rate in the utility function 11.0075 = 0.993
σ Coefficient of relative risk aversion 4
η Elasticity of labour supply in the utility function 1
J Share of working capital to be financed externally [0, 1]
ω Share of firms that cannot adjust prices optimally 0.85
κ Slope parameter of the NKPC 0.028
Mean (per annum) 1β − 1 = 3%
Net Natural rate Max. depth of the large negative shock (per annum) −6%
of interest Standard deviation [per annum, σ(rn)] 3
Shock persistence (ρ) 0.65
Taylor Rule
Inflation Target (per annum) 0%
Coefficient on inflation (φpi) 1.5
Coefficient on output (φx) 1
FG Rule Output gap threshold (a) −0.25%
Few parameter values are worth noting here. Following Woodford (2003), the discount rate (β)
has been set at 0.993 to be compatible with the mean value of natural interest rate of 3% annually. The
standard deviation of the natural interest rate is set at 3 (annually), which ensures the probability of
hitting the ZLB under the baseline calibration for the no-cost channel economy is approximately 6%.
Following Nakov (2008), the coefficient of relative risk aversion (σ) is set at 4. The inverse of this
parameter, σ−1, is interpreted as the real interest rate elasticity of aggregate demand, which is equal
to 0.25. The value of slope parameter of the NKPC is 0.028. This value has been calculated using the
formula derived from the micro-foundations, as stated in Section 5.3.1, and the baseline calibration of
the structural parameters given in Table 5.1. As analysed in Chapter 4, I consider lower values for the
slope parameter under a separate section (Section 5.5.3.3) to examine the robustness of the results.
In the baseline calibration, following the literature, I have considered a large negative shock to the
natural interest rate, with a maximum depth of -6% annually. The persistence of the shock (ρ) is set at
59The maximum number of state variables used in a simulation in this study is three. For example, in the baseline
specification with the CTTR, there are only two state variables; pit−1and rnt . For the forward guidance experiment, there
are three state variables involved; it−1 , xt−1and r
n
t .
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0.65, which means the natural interest rate would take approximately 15 quarters to recover following
the shock.
The Taylor rule parameters, coefficient on inflation (φpi) and coefficient on output (φx) are set at
1.5 and 1, respectively. The value for φpi is identical to the original Taylor rule parameter in Taylor
(1993). However, the value for φx is different from the original Taylor rule value of 0.5. Former
Fed chair Ben Bernanke, as well as current Fed chair Jannet Yellen, among others, propose a higher
weight for the output coefficient of the Taylor rule, considering the Federal Open Market Committee’s
balanced approach in responding to inflation and output variations (see Bernanke, 2015 and Yellen,
2012). Accordingly, in the baseline calibration, I consider φx = 1.
In the FG rule, I consider a = −0.25. This means, the monetary authority delays the exit of the
zero interest rate regime until the lagged output gap recovers below 0.25%.
The next section is devoted to reporting simulation outcomes and discussing results.
5.5 Simulations and Results
5.5.1 Introduction
In this section, I simulate the model for the baseline specification and carry out robustness checks and
sensitivity analysis.60 First, I specify the path of the natural interest rate in a simulated liquidity-trap.
Then, the CTTR is considered in detail and I then compare and contrast the results in a cost channel
and a no-cost channel economy. Next, I move to robustness checks and sensitivity analysis under
CTTR. Under the robustness check, I consider alternative TTRs and an alternative calibration with
a lower value for the slope of the NKPC. Finally, I examine the FG rule and conduct a sensitivity
analysis for the FG rule.
For each specification of the simulation exercise, 20, 000 replications are simulated. Each of
those replications is 4, 000 periods long.61 When calculating the probability of nominal interest rates
60Matlab (version R2016a) has been used to facilitate the simulations. The high level Matlab routines developed
by Miranda and Fackler (2004) have been used in my codes. These Matlab routines are freely available at:
http://www4.ncsu.edu/~pfackler/compecon/toolbox.html under the name CompEcon Toolbox for Matlab. The Matalb
codes of Nakov (2008) and Adam and Billi (2006, 2007) were also beneficial for the development of the codes for my
model. The Nakov (2008) codes are available at: https://sites.google.com/site/antonnakov/software while the Adam and
Billi (2006, 2007) codes are available at: http://www.rmbilli.com/. I am grateful to those authors for making their codes
available to the public.
61The baseline simulation under the CTTR in the cost channel model took 8 minutes to converge in an Intel Core i7
processor (3.10 GHz, 4 cores) personal computer. The baseline simulation under the FG rule (a = −0.25) with the cost
channel, took 6.4 hours to converge.
88
5.5 Simulations and Results
binding at the zero level, the first 1, 000 periods have been dropped, so disturbance from the initial
large negative shock is avoided.
The values reported in tables and figures are in annualised terms. Interest rates are given in net
annualised percentages. The baseline parametrisation has been considered for all the simulations,
except in robustness checks and the sensitivity analysis.
5.5.2 Path of the Natural Interest Rate
The dynamic path of the natural interest rate in a simulated liquidity-trap environment is considered
in this section. As depicted in Figure 5.1, a large negative exogenous shock to the natural interest rate
takes it to its maximum depth of -6% in the 15th quarter. The natural rate stays at the minimum value
for 10 more quarters, before recovering to its steady state value in the next 15 quarters.
Figure 5.1: Path of Net Natural Interest Rate
5.5.3 Truncated Taylor Rules
The main aim of this section is to analyse the impact of the cost channel on macroeconomic variables
when the monetary authority conducts monetary policy with TTRs as defined in Section 5.3.2.1. For
this purpose, I mainly focus on the CTTR. I examine the robustness of the results with alternative
TTRs as defined in Section 5.3.2.1.
5.5.3.1 Contemporaneous Truncated Taylor Rule The CTTR is analysed in this section. First,
the case without the ZLB constraint is considered, then I move to the case with the ZLB constraint.
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Analysis without the ZLB Constraint
In this section, it is assumed that policy interest rates are not constrained by the ZLB. The two
polar cases, i.e. the case J = 0 and the case J = 1 are considered. Recall, J = 1 assumes that firms
borrow all of their working capital requirements externally in advance, while J = 0 assumes firms
do not borrow externally for working capital purposes. I also consider both the deterministic scenario
[σ(rn) = 0] and the baseline stochastic specification [σ(rn) = 3, annually].
Figure 5.2 depicts the paths of four simulated variables, i.e. inflation, net nominal interest rate,
output gap and net real interest rate during the negative demand shock period. Three scenarios are
considered; cost channel (red line with diamonds) and no-cost channel (blue line with squares) eco-
nomies in a stochastic setting, and a cost channel economy in a deterministic setting (green line with
crosses). According to the figure, basically, all four variables in all three scenarios follow the be-
haviour of the natural interest rate. In addition, the figure shows that paths of variables are almost
identical in the stochastic and the deterministic setting in cost channel economies. This is true for
the no-cost channel economy as well, which has not been shown in the figure. Further, the stochastic
steady state values of variables are identical to the deterministic steady state values, irrespective of
the cost channel. These results show that uncertainty does not matter significantly in this set-up, if
the ZLB constraint is not taken into consideration.
Figure 5.2 further shows that the cost channel economy is more deflationary in a recession than
the no-cost channel economy. This is because, during the shock period when the central bank cuts
interest rates, the marginal cost of production drops more in cost channel economies than in no-cost
channel economies, resulting a larger drop in inflation.
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Figure 5.2: Paths of Variables under CTTR - No ZLB Constraint
Analysis with the ZLB Constraint
This section carries out one of the most important analyses of this study, i.e. the analysis with the
ZLB constraint under the CTTR.
First, I consider the probability of the policy rate hitting the ZLB in a cost channel economy as
well as in a no-cost channel economy. Figure 5.3 depicts relationship between probability of hitting
the ZLB against the standard deviation of natural interest rate. The figure shows that, as expected, the
increase in uncertainty increases the probability of hitting the ZLB exponentially. For the baseline
calibration in a no-cost channel economy, the probability of hitting the ZLB is 5.9% (see Table 5.2
for values). This means that there is a possibility of approaching a liquidity trap in around six years
during a 100 year period. As the figure shows, the important finding is that the probability of hitting
the ZLB in the cost channel economy is equal to or higher than the probability of hitting it in the
no-cost channel economy; the higher the uncertainty, the greater the difference. For example, under
the baseline calibration, the likelihood of the cost channel economy hitting the ZLB is 9.9%, which
is 4 percentage points or 66.6% higher than a no-cost channel economy. The reason is as follows:
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Irrespective of the cost channel, when the economy is hit by a large negative demand shock, agents
expect lower future inflation. This would lower current inflation, thereby lowering nominal interest
rates as the central bank is following a TTR. This action validates agents’ previous lower expected
inflation figures, prompting them to further lower their inflation expectations and so on. In addition
to that, in cost channel economies, current inflation drops further due to the direct impact of the
interest rate cut on production costs through the cost channel. Accordingly, the central bank in the
cost channel economy has to cut interest rates more in the second cycle and on. Accordingly, cost
channel economies are more likely to hit the ZLB than no-cost channel economies.
Figure 5.3: Std. Dev. of Natural Interest Rate Vs Probability of Hitting the ZLB
Now I move to the analysis of the paths of variables in a liquidity trap scenario under the ZLB
constraint. First, I consider the path of inflation in a cost channel economy in a deterministic setting.
This is depicted by the green line with crosses in the top left panel of Figure 5.4. This line shows that
the deterministic steady state achieves the inflation target of 0%. This result is true for the no-cost
channel economy as well, which is not shown in the figure.
The path of inflation in a stochastic no-cost channel economy is depicted by the blue line with
squares in the top left panel of Figure 5.4. In general, inflation follows the path of the natural interest
rate. However, note that the steady state value of inflation is not the deterministic steady state value.
This is the risky steady state. The asymmetry introduced by the ZLB constraint causes inflation to
undershoot its target. This happens as follows: When the economy hits with a large negative shock,
the ZLB binds; therefore, the additional decline in the real wage will not be contained.62 However,
62Additional decline in real wages at the ZLB occurs as follows: Since the nominal interest rate is stuck at the zero level
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in contrast, due to a large positive shock, upward adjustments in the policy rate will partially temper
the subsequent increase in real wages. Therefore, under uncertainty, this asymmetry in real wages
lowers expected real wages and in turn reduces the expected cost of production at the steady state.
That is, the ZLB makes the distribution of the cost of production asymmetric. This makes expected
production costs lower compared to the no-ZLB constraint scenario, leading forward-looking private
sector firms to reduce current prices. A reduction in prices reduces current inflation, even though no
shock has actually happened. This produces the deflation bias at the steady state (see Hills et al.,
2016, pp.9-10). This mechanism is further elaborated upon in the positive shock analysis later in this
section.
Figure 5.4: Paths of Variables under CTTR - With the ZLB Constraint
The red line with diamonds in the top left panel of Figure 5.4 depicts the path of inflation in
a cost channel economy under uncertainty. This line shows that the risky steady state inflation is
around 21 basis points lower in the cost channel economy compared to the no-cost channel economy.
Further, inflation in the cost channel economy also follows the behaviour of the natural interest rate,
and households revise inflation expectations downwards, real interest rates increase. Increase in real interest rates reduces
household consumption, lowering aggregate demand. Firms respond to the lower aggregate demand by reducing prices
and cutting down labour demand. This mechanism reduces the real wage at the ZLB compared to the no-ZLB constraint
scenario (see Gavin et al., 2015, p.22).
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although deflation is higher than in no-cost channel economies throughout the simulation. The larger
deflation bias in the cost channel economy in the risky steady state arises for two reasons. First, the
real interest rate is higher in the liquidity trap in cost channel economies than in no-cost channel
economies (this is evident from the bottom left panel of Figure 5.4). This higher real interest rate in
the cost channel economy amplifies the asymmetry in production costs more than in no-cost channel
economies. Second, as observed earlier, the probability of hitting the ZLB in cost channel economies
is higher than in no-cost channel economies. This makes agents expect more recessions in the future.
This effect further amplifies the asymmetry in expected production costs compared to no-cost channel
economies. These two causes result in a higher deflation bias in cost channel economies at the risky
steady state.
The top right panel of Figure 5.4 shows the path of nominal interest rates. In the risky steady
state, the nominal interest rate is lower than the deterministic steady state in both economies. This
happens because inflation is lower than the target rate in the risky steady state. Accordingly, the
CTTR prescribes a lower nominal interest rate than in the deterministic steady state.
The bottom left panel of Figure 5.4 depicts the path of the output gap. The figure shows that
during the liquidity-trap, the output gap in the stochastic case is higher than in the deterministic case
in a cost channel economy. This is because, irrespective of the cost channel, the real interest rate is
higher, in turn, the output gap is higher in the stochastic case than in the deterministic case due to
higher deflation. Further, the output gap is higher in the cost channel economy than in the no-cost
channel economy, because the real interest rate is high in the cost channel economy.
To investigate the risky steady state inflation further, I plot the probability of hitting the ZLB and
risky steady state inflation in Figure 5.5. The figure clearly shows that there is a significant difference
between risky steady states in cost channel and no-cost channel economies when the uncertainty is
high.
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Figure 5.5: Probability of Hitting the ZLB Vs Steady State Inflation
Persistence of the Zero Lower Bound for Different Values of J
The probability of the persistence of the ZLB is discussed in this section. This probability is
conditional on interest rates being binding at the zero level in quarter one following a negative demand
shock. The probability of the persistence of the ZLB for different values of J is plotted in Figure
5.6. Note that J = 0.6 is considered as the empirically relevant value for the US economy.63 The
figure shows that when the ZLB is binding, interest rates remain at the ZLB longer in cost channel
economies, than in no-cost channel economies.
Figure 5.6: Probability of Persistence of the ZLB Conditional on Interest Rates Being Binding in Q1
63As mentioned before, Christiano et al. (2015) estimated that firms borrowed around 56.2% of their working capital
externally in the post-war USA economy. Accordingly, I consider the more empirically relevant value of J = 0.6.
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Macroeconomic Performances under the CTTR for Different Values of J
Figure 5.7 and the corresponding Table 5.2 display paths of variables and macroeconomic per-
formances, respectively, under the CTTR for different strengths of the cost channel in the economy.
The figure shows that the higher the value of J , or in other words, the stronger the cost channel in the
economy, any recession is relatively more severe and deviations from the deterministic steady state
are larger. When J = 0.6, inflation undershoots about 16 basis points from its deterministic steady
state value.
Figure 5.7: Paths of Variables under CTTR for Different Values of J
Table 5.2 shows that the value of J and the probability of hitting the ZLB are positively correlated.
Further, it shows when the cost channel is present in the economy, standard deviations of macroeco-
nomic variables are higher. The welfare analysis shows that the higher the uncertainty, the higher the
welfare loss. Further, the welfare loss is significantly high in cost channel economies compared to
no-cost channel economies. For example, Table 5.2 shows that the welfare loss in the full cost channel
economy is almost four times higher than the loss in the no-cost channel economy.
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Table 5.2: Macroeconomic Performances under CTTR for Different Values of J
Analysis with a Large Positive Shock to the Economy
Paths of variables under a corresponding large positive shock are considered in this section. For
comparison purposes, dynamic paths of variables under both positive and negative shocks in cost
channel and no-cost channel economies are depicted in Figure 5.8. It is evident from the figure that
drops in both inflation and the output gap are larger due to a negative shock than the corresponding
increases due to a positive shock. On the other hand, the drop in the real interest rate is lower in the
liquidity trap under a negative shock compared to a corresponding increase under a positive shock.
These observations are true for both cost and no-cost economies.
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Figure 5.8: Paths of Variables to a Large Positive Shock to the Economy under CTTR
To demonstrate the asymmetry in quantitative terms, I tabulate values in Table 5.3. The table
gives the absolute maximum change in inflation and the output gap during both negative and positive
shocks.64 Furthermore, the table gives values for both cost and no-cost channel economies. For the
no-cost channel (cost channel) economy, the table shows that the drop in inflation under a negative
shock is 152 (187) basis points, compared to corresponding lower increase of 133 (174) basis points
under a positive shock. The same behaviour is observed for the output gap in both economies. On
the other hand, the drop in the real interest rate is lower under a negative shock compared to the
corresponding increase due to a positive shock. This asymmetry observed in real interest rates causes
the asymmetry in expected real wages, as discussed above. Consequently, it creates an asymmetry in
the expected cost of production, resulting in a deflation bias in the steady state. As seen in the table,
since the asymmetry in the real interest rate is larger in the cost channel economy, a large deflation
bias is observed in the cost channel economy compared to the no-cost channel economy.
64The absolute maximum change is the maximum deviation (in absolute terms) of each variable between following two
states of the economy: the risky steady state and liquidity-trapped recession.
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Table 5.3: Absolute Maximum Change in Variables for Positive and Negative Shocks under the CTTR
Main Results Observed for the CTTR
The following major results are obtained under the CTTR. First, when there is no ZLB constraint,
the dynamic paths of variables due to a negative demand shock are almost identical under uncertainty
and no-uncertainty. This result is true irrespective of the cost channel. Second, the probability of
hitting the ZLB in cost channel economies is larger and more persistent under uncertainty, compared
to that in no-cost channel economies. Third, the risky steady state of a cost channel economy is
different (more deflation bias) from the risky steady state of a no-cost channel economy. Finally, the
welfare loss is higher when uncertainty is high and the welfare loss is significantly higher in cost
channel economies.
5.5.3.2 Alternative Interest Rules In this section, I consider three variations of the TTR defined
in Section 5.3.2.1 to examine the robustness of results found under the CTTR. First, I consider the
backward-looking truncated rule.
Backward-looking Truncated Taylor Rule
Figure 5.9 depicts the dynamic paths of variables under the BLTR for both cost and no-cost chan-
nel economies (red line with diamonds and blue line with squares, respectively). For comparison
purposes, paths of variables under the CTTR in a cost channel economy are also depicted (pink line
with circles). The figure shows that under the BLTR, the wedge between the risky steady state and
the deterministic steady state is less, irrespective of the cost channel, compared to under the CTTR.
However, the main results found under CTTR is confirmed under the BLTR.
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Figure 5.9: Paths of Variables under BLTR
Forward-looking Truncated Taylor Rule
Figure 5.10 depicts the dynamic paths of variables under the FLTR. The figure shows that under
the FLTR, the wedge between the risky steady state and the deterministic steady state is even lower
(compared to the BLTR), irrespective of the cost channel, compared to under the BLTR.
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Figure 5.10: Paths of Variables under FLTR
Interest Rate Smoothing Truncated Rule
Figure 5.11 depicts the dynamic paths of variables under the ISTR. In addition to the baseline
calibration, the interest rate smoothing coefficient (φi) has been set at 0.9. The figure shows that
nominal interest rates do not reach the ZLB under both cost and no-cost channel economies under the
ISTR. This is due to the nominal interest rate smoothing.
Under ISTR, the cost channel economy is more deflationary in the liquidity trap and more deflation
bias at the steady state than in the other two alternative analyses above and the CTTR.
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Figure 5.11: Paths of Variables under ISTR
The macroeconomic performances for the alternative rules discussed above and the CTTR are
given in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Macroeconomic Performances under Alternative Interest Rules
The alternative interest rate rule analysis shows the main results found under the CTTR are robust
under the alternatives rules considered.
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5.5.3.3 Alternative Calibration with a Lower Value of Slope of NKPC In Chapter 4 under
Section 4.4.7.1, I considered an alternative calibration with a lower value of the slope of the NKPC.
As I mentioned there, this was to match the empirical findings of the slope of the NKPC. In this study
too, I consider the robustness of results for a smaller value of the slope coefficient in a reduced-form
way. First, I consider the slope of the NKPC = 0.05 (baseline value of the slope of the NKPC = 0.14).
Figure 5.12 shows the results. The figure confirms the results found under baseline calibration.
Figure 5.12: Paths of Variables under CTTR - With Lower Slope of NKPC (Slope= 0.05)
Further, I consider a range of values for the slope of the NKPC and the standard deviation of the
natural interest rate shock to confirm the above results. The results are shown in Table 5.5., which
confirms the main findings of the baseline analysis.
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Table 5.5: Sensitivity Analysis - Slope of the NKPC and Standard Deviation of Shock
5.5.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis The sensitivity analysis under the CTTR with a large negative shock
to the natural interest rates confirms the above results to various values of parameters as shown in
Table 5.6.
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Table 5.6: Sensitivity Analysis under CTTR
5.5.4 Forward Guidance Rule
This section considers the FG rule as described in Section 5.3.2.2. Recall, the rule specifies that the
monetary authority promises to delay exiting the zero interest rate policy following a liquidity-trapped
recession until the lagged output gap returns to a specific level given by the parameter a. Further, it
is assumed, whenever the ZLB is not binding, the central bank follows the baseline Taylor rule: the
CTTR.
First, I simulate the model with a baseline calibration and then move to sensitivity analysis.
5.5.4.1 Baseline Simulation Figure 5.13 depicts paths of variables under forward guidance. Re-
call in the baseline case: a = −0.25. For comparison purposes, four different specifications are
depicted as follows: (a) the stochastic cost channel economy under the CTTR (light blue line with
squares), (b) The FG rule in a stochastic no-cost channel economy (dark blue line with triangles), (c)
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The FG rule in a stochastic cost channel economy (red line with diamonds) and (d) The FG rule in a
deterministic cost channel economy (green dashed line).
The top right panel of Figure 5.13 depicts paths of nominal interest rates. Under forward guidance,
the central bank holds interest rates at the zero level for longer – an additional 2 quarters – both under
cost channel and no-cost channel economies, compared to the CTTR case.
Figure 5.13: Paths of Variables under Forward Guidance
The top left panel of Figure 5.13 shows the dynamic paths of inflation. It is immediately clear that
under forward guidance, there is no deflation bias in the steady state; rather, the inflation bias is evid-
ent, especially in cost channel economies.65 Table 5.7 shows that the inflation bias is observed only
when the central bank carries out strict forward guidance, while the deflation bias is observed when
the central bank carries out weak forward guidance.66 Accordingly, by announcing an appropriate
FG rule, the central bank can achieve its inflation target. According to the analysis, the appropriate
65Table 5.7 gives quantitative values for the inflation bias. When a = −0.25 – baseline value – the inflation bias
for the no-cost channel economy is marginal with 1 basis point while the inflation bias for the cost channel economy is
significantly high with 21 basis points.
66I consider a >= −0.5 as strict forward guidance.
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approximate value for the no-cost channel economy is a = −0.30 while for the cost channel economy
it is a = −0.45.
The observation of higher risky steady state inflation under the FG rule is due to two distinct and
opposite effects. The first occurs irrespective of the forward guidance, as explained in Section 5.5.3.1
under the CTTR. When the economy is hit with a large negative shock; the ZLB binds; therefore,
the additional decline in the real wage will not be contained, which is not observed under a positive
shock. This asymmetry of real wages lowers expected real wages and thereby the expected cost of
production, which in turn reduces steady state inflation.
The second effect is explicitly due to the FG rule. Under forward guidance, the central bank prom-
ises to keep zero interest rates longer following a liquidity-trap. This announcement revises private
sector inflationary expectations upwards and thereby increases actual inflation during a liquidity trap.
Consequently, it reduces expected real interest rates, and thereby increasing expected real wages.67
This effect does not prevail in the case of a corresponding large positive shock. Accordingly, it cre-
ates an asymmetry in the expected production cost in the opposite direction to the first effect.68 This
results in higher inflation in the risky steady state.
The net impact of the above two distinct effects determines the steady state inflation under forward
guidance. If the first effect is dominant, the deflation bias is observed in the steady state. If the second
effect is dominant, i.e. when the strict forward guidance is carried out, the inflation bias is observed.
The cost channel amplifies the above effects, as the cost channel makes the ZLB more frequent.
The bottom left panel of Figure 5.13 shows that the recession is milder under forward guidance,
irrespective of the cost channel. This is because the central bank can manage the expectations of the
private sector under forward guidance and increase inflation expectations to stimulate the economy.
The macroeconomic performances under different specifications of the FG rule and under the
CTTR are given in Table 5.7. The table shows that, whenever the central bank carries out a very
weak forward guidance (for example, a = −10), the results converge to the CTTR specification.
The table confirms that the depth of the recession is improved with the FG rule, compared to the
CTTR policy. For example, in the recession, the lowest value of the output gap for forward guidance
when a = −0.25 is -0.93, compared to the value of -1.11 reported under the CTTR in cost channel
economies. The table shows that the welfare loss is also reduced significantly under strict forward
67The argument for additional increase in expected real wages at the ZLB under the FG rule is analogous to the CTTR
given in Footnote 62.
68This asymmetry is further elaborated under the positive shock analysis under the FG rule later in this section.
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guidance, irrespective of the cost channel, compared to under the CTTR.
Table 5.7: Macroeconomic Performances under Forward Guidance
Analysis with a Large Positive Shock to the Economy
Paths of variables under the FG rule due to a corresponding positive shock are considered in this
section. Paths are given in the Figure 5.14.
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Figure 5.14: Paths of Variables to a Large Positive Shock to the Economy under Forward Guidance
To illustrate the asymmetry in quantitative terms, I tabulate values in Table 5.8. The table gives
the absolute change in inflation and the output gap under both negative and positive shocks as well
as cost and no-cost channel economies under forward guidance.69 In contrast to the finding under
the CTTR, Figure 5.14 and corresponding Table 5.8, show that under the FG rule, the asymmetry
between negative and positive shocks has been reduced. In particular, the drop in the real interest rate
in a negative shock is larger. Under the FG rule, the additional drop in real interest rates increases
expected real wages compared to under the CTTR, affecting the asymmetry in expected production
costs. These results are valid for both cost and no-cost channel economies, but magnitudes are larger
for the cost channel economy.
69The absolute maximum change is the maximum deviation (in absolute terms) of each variable between following two
states of the economy: the risky steady state and liquidity-trapped recession.
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Table 5.8: Absolute Maximum Change in Variables for Positive and Negative Shocks under FG
Main Results Observed for the Forward Guidance Rule
Irrespective of the cost channel, the following results are obtained under the FG rule. First, the
deflation bias observed under TTR policies can be avoided using the FG rule. Further, strict forward
guidance generates an inflation bias in the risky steady state. Second, forward guidance reduces the
probability of hitting the ZLB compared to under the CTTR policy. Third, recessions under the FG
rule are less painful than under the CTTR.
The cost channel increases the inflation bias of forward guidance.
5.5.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis The sensitivity analysis for the FG rule when a = −0.25 is given in
Table 5.9. This analysis confirms the robustness of the findings of the above section.
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Table 5.9: Sensitivity Analysis under Forward Guidance
The next section concludes the chapter.
5.6 Conclusion
The main aim of this study was to examine the behaviour of the main macroeconomic variables under
interest rate rules in a cost channel economy in the presence of the ZLB. The ZLB is considered as an
occasionally binding constraint. In addition to this, an endogenous threshold-based forward guidance
rule was examined.
The study revealed some important results for the conducting of monetary policy in a cost channel
economy at the ZLB under a TTR. First, the probability of hitting the ZLB is larger in cost channel
economies under uncertainty compared to that of no-cost channel economies. This is because, during
the shock period when the central bank cuts interest rates, the marginal cost of production drops
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more in cost channel economies than in no-cost channel economies, resulting in a larger drop in
inflation. This result shows that the cost channel economy is more likely to fall into a liquidity-
trapped recession. Further, cost channel economies remain longer in the liquidity trap than no-cost
channel economies. Second, the risky steady state of a cost channel economy is different (more
deflation bias) from the risky steady state of a no-cost channel economy. The reason for that is
the amplified asymmetry of the expected cost of production created by the ZLB constraint in cost
channel economies. The study also revealed that the welfare loss is higher when uncertainty is high
and the welfare loss is significantly higher in cost channel economies compared to in no-cost channel
economies. The above results suggest that achieving the inflation target in cost channel economies is
more challenging than in no-cost channel economies, if agents expect future liquidity traps.
According to the FG rule, the monetary authority promises to keep interest rates at the ZLB
following a liquidity trap until the lag of the output gap recovers up to a pre-determined and pre-
announced value. The monetary authority announces the FG rule at time zero. Under the FG rule,
the following results hold, irrespective of the cost channel: First, by announcing an appropriate FG
rule, the deflation bias observed under the TTR policy can be avoided. In addition, strict forward
guidance leads to an inflation bias in the risky steady state. This happens because of the following:
since the monetary authority promises to keep interest rates at the ZLB longer, the private sector
revises inflation expectations upward. Consequently, the asymmetry of expected production costs
causes agents to expect higher production costs during the ZLB policy period. This makes current
prices higher, resulting in a higher inflation at the steady state. Second, forward guidance reduces the
probability of hitting the ZLB compared to the TTR policy. Third, the depth of the recession under the
FG rule is less painful and welfare maximising than under the TTR policy. The cost channel amplifies
the increase in inflation at the risky steady state under the FG rule.
The following chapter provides conclusions and a discussion of the overall study.
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This chapter provides conclusions and a discussion of the overall study. I begin with conclusions,
which is followed by the discussion.
6.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, I attempted to contribute to the literature by analysing the effects of several monetary
policy strategies in the presence of the ZLB when the cost channel of monetary policy exists. For
this purpose, I considered three different but related studies. First, I incorporated the cost channel in
an existing model to analyse the jobless recovery process and an unconventional interest rate-based
exit policy during a liquidity-trapped recession. Second, I evaluated optimal monetary policy in a
cost channel economy at the ZLB. Third, I studied interest rate rules and forward guidance rules in a
cost channel economy in the presence of the ZLB and under uncertainty. In each of these studies, I
compared and contrasted the effects of monetary policy actions in cost channel and no-cost channel
economies.
In the first study, in Chapter 3, I extended the SGU model to incorporate the cost channel of
monetary policy and reexamined the robustness of the SGU’s unconventional policy prescription.
SGU prescribes a tight monetary policy during the recession to take the economy out of the slump
with jobs. The present model with the cost channel has two steady states: one is the intended steady
state with full employment and the other one is the unintended steady state with unemployment. This
result is identical to that of the SGU study, where the economy has no-cost channel. However, the
results of the simulation exercise show that the existence of the cost channel implies that the SGU
policy induces sharp initial contractions in the employment rate and the growth rate, and a sharp
increase in inflation following a negative confidence shock. The welfare analysis confirms that the
welfare of economic agents in a cost channel economy is less compared to that of economic agents in
a no-cost channel economy, due to the SGU policy prescription.
Two alternative interest rate-based exit policies were also considered. In this analysis, I have
two main results: i) Irrespective of the presence of the cost channel, welfare-wise, the Overshoot
policy is superior to that of the SGU policy. The Overshoot policy suggests increasing interest rates
significantly above the SGU target rate and gradually reduce to the target rate over time, and ii) An
exit policy characterised by a staggered interest rate increase (Staggered policy) lowers immediate
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pain to the economy compared to the SGU policy or the Overshoot policy. However, welfare-wise,
the Staggered policy is inferior to the other two policies examined.
In the second study, in Chapter 4, I examined optimal monetary policy in a cost channel economy
in the presence of the ZLB. For this purpose, I incorporated the cost channel of monetary policy
into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model and evaluated optimal monetary policy, both under
discretion and under commitment, at the ZLB. The study revealed some insights into the conducting
of optimal monetary policy in a cost channel economy at the ZLB. First, discretionary policy requires
central banks to keep interest rates at the zero level for longer in a cost channel economy than in a no-
cost channel economy. This is because, in cost channel economies, the deflation is high and persistent
due to a larger negative demand shock than that found in no-cost channel economies. Further, cost
channel economies introduce a policy trade-off between inflation and the output gap. Under the
commitment policy, the simulation exercise showed that the central bank is able to terminate the zero
interest rate regime earlier in a cost channel economy than otherwise. The reason for that is, in a cost
channel economy, the private sector has inflated inflationary expectations when the central bank is
planning to conduct a tight monetary policy. This result is in contrast to the results found under the
discretionary policy.
It was also revealed that the cost channel generates high welfare losses under both discretionary
and commitment policies, while the welfare loss is substantially high under discretionary policy.
Accordingly, abstracting the cost channel in these type of models can lead to under estimation of
welfare losses.
Finally, in the third study, in Chapter 5, I evaluated interest rate rules at the ZLB in a cost channel
economy. In addition, an endogenous threshold-based forward guidance policy rule is evaluated. This
FG rule presents an endogenous regime change in a liquidity trap. A New Keynesian model with the
cost channel is deployed while a numerical method is used to solve the stochastic model. The study
revealed some insights into the conducting of monetary policy with rules in a cost channel economy at
the ZLB. Under the TTRs studied in this chapter, first, the cost channel economy is more likely to fall
into a liquidity trap and remain longer than is the no-cost channel economy. Second, the risky steady
state of a cost channel economy is more deflation bias than a no-cost channel economy. The reason
for that is the amplified asymmetry of the expected production cost created by the ZLB constraint
in cost channel economies. These results suggest that achieving the inflation target in cost channel
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economies is more challenging than in no-cost channel economies, if agents expect future liquidity
traps. The welfare analysis shows that the welfare loss is higher when uncertainty is high and it is
significantly higher in cost channel economies than in no-cost channel economies.
Under the FG rule, the following results hold, irrespective of the cost channel. First, by announ-
cing an appropriate FG rule at time zero, the deflation bias observed under the TTRs can be avoided.
In addition, strict FG leads to an inflation bias in the risky steady state. Second, the FG rule reduces
the probability of the economy reaching the liquidity trap compared to the TTR policy. Third, the
recession is milder under the FG rule and the loss of welfare is lower than that of the TTR. The in-
troduction of the cost channel increases the inflation bias at the risky steady state under the FG rule.
These results reveal that an endogenous threshold-based FG rule announced well before the economy
gets into a liquidity-trapped recession could help central banks to achieve their inflation targets at the
steady state.
The overall conclusions of the thesis are as follows: Monetary policy strategies considered in this
study under an unconventional monetary policy, under optimal conduct of monetary policy and under
interest rate rules affect the economy differently when the cost channel of monetary policy exists in the
presence of the ZLB. Importantly, the liquidity-trapped recession is deeper in cost channel economies
compared to no-cost channel economies. The endogenous FG rule is able to avoid the deflation bias
observed under TTRs. Further, the inclusion of the cost channel in the model economies examined
reduces welfare, while in some instances, the cost channel reduces welfare significantly.
The findings of this thesis suggest that if a cost channel is present in an economy, the transmission
of monetary policy may be different from that in a no-cost channel economy in the presence of the
ZLB. Therefore, central banks should pay careful attention to the cost channel of monetary policy
when they set policies under such economic conditions.
6.2 Discussion
In this section, I discuss critical assumptions made within the study, limitations of the study and future
possible studies.
In this study, I found the cost channel of monetary policy is an important transmission channel
in the presence of the ZLB. To reach that conclusion, I assumed that the cost channel exists in the
economy. In other words, a main assumption of this study is that firms borrow externally to cover their
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working capital requirements. Yet, I attempted to justify that assumption in Chapter 2 by reviewing
relevant empirical literature.
In general, in this study, I assumed that the ZLB is a constraint for the monetary authority. But,
as mentioned before, few modern central banks have pushed nominal interest rates slightly below
the zero level recently, mainly following the Great Recession. Therefore, it would be interesting
to consider what would be the result, if we relaxed this assumption. Rather than allowing nominal
interest rates to move freely in the negative territory, it would be interesting to study the dynamics of
variables by imposing a floor below the zero level. In such a situation, in a cost channel economy, the
production cost may be further lowered due to negative nominal interest rates. This may further lower
prices due to a negative shock through the cost channel mechanism, thus generating more deflation.
Accordingly, the cost channel economy may move further into the recession under such a setting.
Another important assumption that I made in this study is the one-to-one transmission of changes
in policy interest rates into the short-term retail interest rates. However, retail rates may be different
from the policy rate for the following reasons: first, the incomplete pass-through of policy rates into
retail rates. Second, the adjustment speed of retail rates in response to policy rates may be sluggish.
Third, retail borrowings may have an added risk premium. The latter is mostly relevant in times of
economic recession and especially, in times of recessions due to financial crises. The first two effects
work in the opposite direction to the third effect. Incorporation of such financial frictions may make
the direct cost channel mechanism active even in zero interest rate regimes.70 This is because, at zero
interest rate regimes, although the policy interest rate is zero, short-term retail interest rates may be
positive.
In this study, I did not consider capital. I assumed the only factor of production is labour. This is a
strong assumption. The main reason for ignoring capital was to have a parsimonious model to analyse
mainly the dynamics of variables in a cost channel economy. However, ignorance of capital is not
uncommon in New Keynesian studies (for example, see basic New Keynesian models in Gali, 2008,
Walsh, 2010 and Woodford, 2003). As Woodford (2003, p.148) puts it, ignoring capital in the model
can be thought of as fixed amount of capital distributed among each firm, while the stock of capital
never depreciates and capital goods never produced. In addition, capital stock is never reallocated
70Recall, direct cost channel mechanism was defined as follows: Changes in nominal interest rates affect production
costs and thereby affect inflation and output. Since, throughout the thesis, I assumed retail interest rates become zero at
zero policy rate regimes, this direct cost channel is not active at zero policy rate regimes. However, if we relaxed that
assumption, direct cost channel mechanism may be active even at zero policy rate regimes.
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among firms.
One possible impact of the introduction of capital when the cost channel is considered, is through
the cost of rental capital. If firms borrow the cost of rental capital externally intra-period, this would
act in the same way as labour costs borrowed externally. In this way, the introduction of capital may
increase the impact of the cost channel.
The way I included the cost channel in the existing models in this thesis is the most common way.
Following much of the literature, I have assumed firms borrow externally intra-period to finance their
wage bill. Accordingly, increases in interest rates affect firms’ cost of production. This mechanism
of the cost channel is more specific. For example, in this specification of the cost channel, firms
borrow only for labour and such borrowings should be externally financed to have an impact on the
production cost. For some sectors, borrowing only for labour is fine. But other sectors, for example,
manufacturers working with intermediate material input, may borrow intra-period for intermediate
material cost as well. Ignorance of this may lead to underestimating the impact of the cost channel.
In relation to this, some studies assume intra-period external borrowings for payments such as invest-
ments, shareholders, bond holders. The assumption of external borrowings is also specific. One can
argue that the use of internal funds to pay the cost of working capital may also increase the cost of
production. This is because of the opportunity cost of internal funds.
There are other ways that scholars include the supply-side effects of monetary policy. For ex-
ample, the incorporation of money in the production function. In this way, an increase in the cost of
money affects the cost of production. However, the money-in-the-production function is not popular
among contemporaneous macroeconomic models. The unpopularity may be mainly due to the lack
of empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that there is an impact of money in the production
process.
This study may attract some further studies. One of them might be to consider an open economy
in a zero interest rate environment.71 This thesis studied the impact of the cost channel on a closed
economy. An open economy introduces exchange rates into the system. In an open economy, for
example, a drop in interest rates depreciates local currency; in turn, the cost of imports becomes
expensive. This affects both the importing of services and the importing of materials. This may
change the impact of the cost channel on real economic activities.
71Lagoa (2010) extended a cost channel economy to an open economy under normal economic conditions. Lagoa found
that the cost channel is an important monetary policy transmission mechanism in an open economy.
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Another interesting extension to this study would be to incorporate capital into the models and
examine the results. As mentioned earlier in this section, the introduction of capital may increase the
impact of the cost channel. Further, the introduction of capital makes way to explore dynamics of
investments.
The study in this thesis mainly focussed on developed countries. The calibration is based on the
US economy. It would be interesting to see how the cost channel would affect developing economies
in the presence of the ZLB.
Another study that might be useful to consider is to examine the impact of the cost channel along
with other monetary policy strategies, which I did not consider in this study. In this study, I considered
mainly interest-rate based strategies. It would be interesting to study balance sheet policies, such as
quantitative easing, to see how they reacted with the cost channel in the presence of the ZLB.
Further, in this study, I considered only one shock in each of the three studies. The first study
considered a confidence shock while the other two studies considered a demand shock to the natural
interest rate. Another direction for further research is to consider other types shocks and explore the
dynamics of variables in a cost channel economy in the presence of the ZLB.
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Appendices
A. Appendix for Chapter 3
A.1
Proof of Proposition 1
The first section of the proof follows SGU’s proof of Proposition 1. For the sake of completeness, I
briefly state the entirety in the following exposition.
At the full employment level, by definition u = 0. Therefore, h = h¯ and c = F (h¯) are the
unique solutions to Equations (3.21) and (3.19). Slackness condition (3.23) is also satisfied. Consider
Equations (3.18) and (3.25). Eliminating R and solving for pi yields:
pi
β˜
= 1,
or
pi
β˜
=
pi∗
β˜
+ αpi(pi − pi∗).
The first equation above yields pi = β˜. However, under downward wage rigidity, it is assumed
γ(0) > β˜µ. Incorporating pi = β˜ in this inequality yields pi < γ(0)
µ
. However, this result is in
contradiction with Equation (3.22).
Now turn to the other solution for pi given by the second equation above. It can be re-arranged as
follows:
(pi − pi∗)(1− β˜αpi) = 0 (6.1)
An assumption in the Taylor Rule specifies: αpiβ˜ > 1. Therefore, the solution for Equation (6.1)
is pi = pi∗. This solution should satisfy the Taylor Rule given by Equation (3.25). The Taylor Rule
simplifies to the following problem:
R = Max
{
1,
pi∗
β˜
}
.
The assumption in the Taylor Rule specification confirms that pi
∗
β˜
> 1. Therefore, pi = pi∗ is the
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unique solution.
Now it has been shown that the unique solution for pi in the full employment steady state is
pi = pi∗ and R = pi
∗
β˜
for all the steady state equations except Equation (3.20). By substituting R = pi
∗
β˜
in Equation (3.20) becomes:
F
′
(h¯) = w
[
1 + J
(
pi∗
β˜
− 1
)]
.
Accordingly, R = pi
∗
β˜
is a unique solution for Equation (3.25).
This completes the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2
The first section of the proof follows SGU’s proof of Proposition 2. For the sake of completeness,
I briefly state the entirety in the following exposition.
Since it is the unemployment steady state, consider the employment ratio, u¯ > 0. Then from
Equation (3.24), it is evident that h < h¯. Consider Equations (3.18) and (3.25). Eliminating R and
solving for pi yields following:
pi
β˜
=
pi∗
β˜
+ αpi(pi − pi∗) + αyln
(
F (h)
F (h¯)
)
,
or
pi
β˜
= 1.
The first equation above can be re-arranged as follows:
(pi − pi∗)(1− αpiβ˜) = αyβ˜ln
(
F (h)
F (h¯)
)
.
Since h < h¯, the right hand side of the last equation is negative. By the assumption αβ˜ > 1, if
the left hand side is to be negative, pi > pi∗ is required. However, the following argument shows that
pi > pi∗ is not possible in the unemployment steady state.
From the slackness condition (3.23), it follows that pi = γ(u¯)
µ
. However, according to the properties
of the wage fall factor of downward wage rigidity, it is possible to show that γ(u¯)
µ
< γ(0)
µ
. However,
according to the assumption on the parameters of the Taylor rule, the following holds: γ(0)
µ
< pi∗.
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Therefore, pi < pi∗.
Accordingly, it has been shown that the unique solution for pi in the unemployment steady state
is pi = β˜ and R = 1 for all the steady state equations except Equation (3.20). Substituting R = 1 in
Equation (3.20) yields:
F
′
(h) = w.
Therefore, the marginal cost Equation (3.20) is also uniquely determined when R = 1 and pi = β˜.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
A.2
The Dynamics of the Economy moving to an Unintended Unemployment Steady State following
a Confidence Shock
Set ξ = 0 for all t. Consider the case pi1 < pi∗, where h0 = h¯. Following SGU, it is possible to show
u1 = 0 and h1 = h¯. It is also possible to find R1 from Equation (3.17). The dynamics for t = 2 and
onwards are calculated as follows:
Equality holds for the wage rigidity condition given in Equation (3.14). This follows from the fact
that ht < h¯ and from using the slackness condition (3.15). Therefore, Equation (3.14) can be written
as follows:
wt+1 =
γ(ut+1)wt
pit+1µ
.
If we combine Equation (3.12) and the last equation, following yields:
F ′(ht+1)
1 + J(Rt+1 − 1) =
γ(ut+1)
pit+1µ
F ′(ht)
1 + J(Rt − 1) . (6.2)
Deriving an Equation for ut
Combining Equations (3.10) and (3.11) and substituting ξ = 0 yields:
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pit+1 = β˜Rt
F (ht+1)
−σ
F (ht)−σ
. (6.3)
It is possible to eliminate pit+1 by combining Equations (6.2) and (6.3) as follows:
γ(ut+1)
µ
=
[1 + J(Rt − 1)]F ′(ht+1)
[1 + J(Rt+1 − 1)]F ′(ht) β˜Rt
F (ht+1)
−σ
F (ht)−σ
. (6.4)
The functional specifications of the production function and the wage rigidity factor in Equation
(6.4) yields:
(1− ut+1)γ1
µ
=
β˜Rt
γ0
[
h¯(1− ut+1)
ht
]−σγ+α−1
[1 + J(Rt − 1)]
[1 + J(Rt+1 − 1)]
This equation can be re-written in terms of ut as follows:
(1− ut)γ1
µ
=
β˜Rt−1
γ0
[
h¯(1− ut)
ht−1
]−σγ+α−1
[1 + J(Rt−1 − 1)]
[1 + J(Rt − 1)] (6.5)
This is a non-linear function of ut. However, the last Equation (6.5) cannot be solved for ut as Rt
is unknown.
Deriving an Interim Value for Rt
The Taylor Rule specifies Rt, as given by Equation (3.17) is as follows:
Rt = Max
{
1,
pi∗
β˜
+ αpi(pit − pi∗) + αyln
(
F (ht)
F (h¯)
)}
.
Now assume Rt > 1. In this case Rt is equal to:
Rt =
pi∗
β˜
+ αpi(pit − pi∗) + αyln
(
F (ht)
F (h¯)
)
.
Substituting the functional form of F (h) into this equation yields:
Rt =
pi∗
β˜
+ αpi(pit − pi∗) + αyln
(
ht
h¯
)α
. (6.6)
Using Equations (3.16), (6.3) and (6.6), it is possible to express Rt as a function of ut as follows:
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Rt =
pi∗
β˜
− αpipi∗ + αyln(1− ut)
1− αpiβ˜
(
h¯(1−ut)
ht−1
)
−ασ
.
The function for Rt given in the last equation is substituted in Equation (6.5) and solved for ut
using numerical methods. Then it is possible to find ht and pit. The solution for ht and pit is then
substituted in Equation (6.6) and the value for Rt is found. If the solution for Rt < 1, I assume the
economy is in a liquidity trap hence use R = R∗ and revise the calculation of ut accordingly.
A.3
Consumption Equivalent Welfare Comparison
Welfare of the Household following a Policy Action
Assume that the policy action is carried out in Period 2. Accordingly, the welfare of the household
is:
w1 =
∞∑
t=2
βt−2
(C1−σt − 1)
1− σ , (6.7)
where Ct is the real consumption given by:
Ct = ctXt, (6.8)
and
Xt = µXt−1.
Without loss of generality, let X2 = 1. Then X3 = µ, X4 = µ2 and so on. In period t:
Xt = µ
t−2,
for t ≥ 2. Combining this equation with Equation (6.8) yields:
Ct = ctµ
t−2.
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Incorporating this result in Equation (6.7) yields:
wf =
∞∑
t=2
βt−2
(ctµ
t−2)1−σ − 1
1− σ .
Since the economy converges to the full employment steady state before the 99th period,72 the
above equation can be expressed as follows:
wf =
99∑
t=2
βt−2
(ctµ
t−2)1−σ − 1
1− σ +
∞∑
t=100
βt−2
(cfssµ
t−2)1−σ − 1
1− σ , (6.9)
where cfss is the full employment steady state consumption. Since at the full employment steady
state hfss = 1, it implies cfss = 1, because cfss = hαfss. Incorporating this result in Equation (6.9), I
obtain:
wf =
99∑
t=2
βt−2
(ctµ
t−2)1−σ − 1
1− σ +
∞∑
t=100
βt−2
(µt−2)1−σ − 1
1− σ .
Further manipulation yields:
wf =
99∑
t=2
βt−2
(ctµ
t−2)1−σ − 1
1− σ +
∞∑
t=100
βt−2(µt−2)1−σ − βt−2
1− σ ,
wf =
99∑
t=2
βt−2
(ctµ
t−2)1−σ − 1
1− σ +
1
1− σ (
∞∑
t=2
(βµ1−σ)t−2 − βt−2)− 1
1− σ (
99∑
t=2
(βµ1−σ)t−2 − βt−2).
Since βµ1−σ, β < 1, incorporating Taylor series approximation, I find:
wf =
99∑
t=2
βt−2
(ctµ
t−2)1−σ − 1
1− σ +
1
1− σ (
1
1− βµ1−σ −
1
1− β )−
1
1− σ
99∑
t=2
((βµ1−σ)t−2 − βt−2).
(6.10)
Now it is possible to calculate a numerical value for the welfare using Equation (6.10), given real
consumption in each period until Period 99, as well as consumption at steady state.
72The simulation exercise confirms that the model economy converges to the full employment steady state well before
the 99th period for the given calibration.
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Welfare of the Household in the Unintended Steady State
The welfare of the unintended steady state is given by:
wuss =
∞∑
t=2
βt−2
(cussµ
t−2)1−σ − 1
1− σ , (6.11)
where cuss is real consumption in the unintended steady state scaled down by the productivity growth.
This equation can be expressed as follows:
wuss =
1
1− σ (c
1−σ
ss
∞∑
t=2
(βµ1−σ)t−2 −
∞∑
t=2
βt−2).
Since βµ1−σ, β < 1, using Taylor series approximation yields:
wuss =
1
1− σ (
c1−σuss
1− βµ1−σ −
1
1− β ). (6.12)
Accordingly, the consumption equivalent of welfare is calculated as:
wf =
1
1− σ (
(cuss(1 + x))
1−σ
1− βµ1−σ −
1
1− β ), (6.13)
where x ∗ 100 is the additional percentage of consumption required in the unintended steady state to
have the same level of welfare in the policy consumption path. By solving the non-linear Equation
(6.13) it is possible to find x.
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B. Appendix for Chapter 4
B.1
Log Linearising Real Marginal Cost
Taking log of (4.5) and substituting At = YtNt yields:
lnψt = ln
[
Wt
Pt
Yt
Nt
]
+ ln [1 + J(Rt − 1)] . (6.14)
For simplification purposes, denote (6.14) as follows:
lnψt = lnSt + lnVt, (6.15)
where St = WtPt
Yt
Nt
and Vt = [1 + J(Rt − 1)] .
At steady state (6.15):
lnψ = lnS + lnV. (6.16)
The log linearised equation given by taking the difference of (6.15) and (6.16):
ψˆt = sˆt + vˆt. (6.17)
Now consider sˆt :
sˆt = wˆt − pˆt + yˆt − nˆt,
Using (4.2) ,sˆt = ηnˆt + σcˆt. Defining xt as the output gap leads to:
sˆt = (σ + η)xt.
Now consider vˆt:
vˆt = ln [1 + J(Rt − 1)]− ln [1 + J(R− 1)] ,
vˆt ≈ J(Rt − 1)− J(R− 1),
vˆt ≈ J(Rt −R),
vˆt ≈ JRˆt.
Substituting this result in (6.17) yields:
ψˆ = (σ + η)xt + JRˆ.
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B.2
Results for the Corner Solution under Discretion:
pi = −rn,
x = −(1− β + Jκ)r
n
κ(η + σ)
,
R = 1,
µ = −βσrn,
δ = −r
n(−1 + β + Jκ)λ+ κσ(1− β)(η + σ)
κ2(η + σ)2
.
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B.3
Figure 6.1: Paths of Variables - With Lower Slope of NKPC (Slope= 0.024)
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